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ABSTRACT
A qualitative research study was carried out to explore
problems of organizational conflict. The conditions and
processes of organizational conflict, issues of substantive
organizational conflict, and organizational learning or
failure to learn were investigated.
A variation of intensive interviewing, semi-structured,
was used to obtain primary information on organizational
events at the Boston Ballet, a nonprofit performing arts
organization made up of a ballet school and a ballet company.
Six organizational members occupying different positions from
the art, teaching, and administrative staffs were
interviewed. Five of the six had been interviewed ten months
earlier in 1984. There were four telephone interviews, two
were follow-up and two were conducted with former
organization members. On average, interviews lasted two
hours. A tape recorder was used during face-to-face
interviews. Thirty-one questions were formulated to focus on
substantive issues of organizational conflict. Letters of
inquiry were also used to obtain information.
Conflict-in-development, in-change, and -in-growth were
discovered at the Boston Ballet. Features of conflict-in-
development include the persistence of conflict around issues
of organizational roles, values, and methods; the stages of
conflict where issues and interactions of conflict occur only
at certain times; the contradictions of conflict where an
organization grows and develops despite conflict; and the
learning from experience in some cases but not in others.
Argyris and Schon's theory-based approach to organizational
learning and problem solving, Model 0-I: Limited Learning
Systems was used to further explore and to explain conflict-
in-development.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
My initial contact with the Boston Ballet, a nonprofit
performing arts organization was as a first-year graduate
student involved in an institutional analysis workshop, that
is, a practicum in the study of organizations where inquiry
into substantive issues of policy, program, and the structure
of arts and cultural institutions was combined with inquiry
into the methodology of institutional analysis. Thus a
course requirement was to select and study firsthand an
arts or cultural organization. The research was divided into
six stages: 1) negotiating access to the organization, 2)
forming a research strategy, 3) interviewing, 4) making
sense of the data, 5) feeding back research results, and
6) participating in a closing-working session where research
findings and experiences were presented and exchanged with
students and faculty from the Science, Systems and Society
program of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
who had also studied arts and cultural organizations that
semester. The organization selected was the Boston Ballet
School, Incorporated, official school of the Boston Ballet,
a professional dance company formed in 1963. My research
1
2topic at that time was to learn what congruence there is
between individual and organizational goals in a performing
arts organization. My findings, though inclusive, were
written up in a combination preliminary report and term
paper that was delivered to the proper individuals in both
settings. Thus, Phase Five of the study remained undone as
I was not invited to return to the organization to report on
my findings. Nonetheless, these findings were fruitful in
that they led to exploring the concept of the suppression
(and denial) of conflict. More specifically I was interested
in finding out when conflict exists, when conflict exists
but is not acknowledged, and when conflict is acknowledged
but is suppressed and denied. This, in turn, led to looking
at some of the substantive issues that provoke conflict;
change, growth, and development in the organizational
environment; the conditions and processes of organizational
conflict; the effects of conflict on the organization,
that is, how an organization really works, how it learns
(or fails to learn) during times of conflict; and finally,
how an organization manages and resolves conflict.
So, when it became necessary to choose a thesis research
topic, the idea of investigating organizational conflict and
some of its related issues by studying the Boston Ballet
School seemed appropriate. I could conduct new research in
an organization where I had gained earlier entry and where I
3was not a stranger to members of the organization. Even so,
I would need permission to gain reentry, for a year had
elapsed. Fortunately, as it turned out, my request was
acknowledged and subsequently I was granted permission to
resume my research. However, as my research progressed, it
became logistically sound to study the whole organization
rather than focusing solely on one entity, the Boston Ballet
School. Therefore, both the Boston Ballet School and the
Boston Ballet Company were studied.
As a student in the planning field with a specialization
in the area of public policy and management while focusing on
problems related to the implementation of public policy;
conflict, dispute resolution, and negotiation; and
organizational analysis, my approach to studying
organizational conflict in a performing arts organization
was from a perspective that evolved as a result of my
studies in these areas. I hasten to add, however, that the
root of this perspective is in the related field of political
science. Therefore, in terms of studying organizations, I
would tend to see organizations as places were contending
individuals and groups of individuals vie for power in order
to control various resources, people, and territories (read
space in terms of the Boston Ballet) and where the conditions
and processes of conflict result in a number of different
outcomes.
In choosing a ballet company and school to investigate
4problems of organizational conflict, the major focus was
not exploring those characteristics of performing arts
organizations that affect their activities and operations.
In other words, it was not my intent to determine while
studying organizational conflict within the context of a
performing arts organization whether or not this particular
type of organization was unique because of its artistic
content and activities. In this respect, I endeavored to
treat the art of ballet in a way similar to how Becker
treated the larger art world. He noted, "I have treated
art as the work some people do, and have been more concerned
with patterns of cooperation among the people who make the
works than with the works themselves or those conventionally
1
defined as their creators." However, rather than focusing
on "patterns of cooperation", I have focused on patterns of
noncooperation, i.e., patterns of organizational conflict,
along with some of the conditions and processes of
organizational conflict. Nonetheless, in viewing the ballet
as the work that people do, it would be naive to ignore the
fact that performing arts organizations have their own unique
features. This is not the same as declaring they have
nothing in common with other types of organizations. I
would assume that all categories of organizations have their
own unique features. Harrison talks about how organizations
have different "ideological orientations". In discussing
these ideological orientations, he contends that the
5failure to recognize ideological issues that underlie
conflict is common among managers and administrators, and
"Much of the conflict that surrounds organization change is
2
really ideological struggle."
Returning to the question of the unique features of
performing arts organizations, it should be noted that within
the context of this paper, performing arts include the art
forms of music, opera theater, and dance. Performing arts
organizations are unique in that their product, that is,
"what the actor does in speaking his lines and moving and
gesturing as directed, what the musician does in playing a
certain sonata on his piano or violin, and what the dancer
3
does in moving his body as required by choreography", are
very difficult products to both evaluate and measure. The
performing arts are also unique because of the debate over
the kinds of people drawn to the world of the performing
arts, who may indeed differ from persons drawn to the
corporate world. Whether the skills required in performing
arts organizations are in the artistic, managerial,
mechanical, or manual areas, they may indeed call for people
who think and see the world in a particular way. In
discussing the subject of dance in relation to creativity,
Kraus and Chapman suggest that, "although there is no single
accepted definition of creativity, one influential view today
is that it is heavily based on 'divergent' thinking and
exploration. As contrasted with 'convergent' (which means
6moving toward a single correct solution or answer),
'divergent' involves searching around, changing directions,
not necessarily flying in the face of convention, but often
coming out with unconventional solutions and answers. It is
felt that creative people are more likely to excel in
4
divergent thinking and creativity." All this is to say that
people who think in certain ways may gravitate towards areas
where artistic and creative skills are required or to those
organizational environments where persons create art
products, help to create, or participate, in one way or
another, in presenting these products.
Again, exploring the question of the kinds of people
who participate in performing arts organizations and the
question of whether or not they are unique or whether
performing arts organizations have unique characteristics
are indeed future research questions. However, performing
arts organizations do have certain unique characteristics.
Some of these characteristics are explored in this paper.
For example, many were founded by performers or art lovers.
Most rely heavily on both public and private sources of
funding. They receive federal and state financial assistance
through their nonprofit tax-exempt status. Many have
experienced problems of growth, change, and development. And
most have had at some time throughout their history periods
of financial instability. In terms of the economics of
performing arts organizations, Lowry notes that,
7"Like colleges and hospitals, a performing arts enterprise
is labor both intensive and limited in one way or another in
the mass distribution of its products. Salaries and fees
average over 70 percent of all expenditures; in any one field
they are over 50 percent. And earned income ranges between 50
and 75 percent among the four performing arts fields, with an
5
average of about 52 percent if they are all taken together."
In attempting to find answers to problems of
organizational conflict by studying the Boston Ballet, I used
Argyris and Schon's Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems, a
conceptual model based on a theory of action approach to
organizational learning, in classifying, analyzing, and
explaining my findings. The strategy was to apply features
of Model 0-I against interview data collected at the Boston
Ballet to discover individual and organizational behavior
that revealed the problems of organizational conflict and
organizational learning. This strategy also involved
attempting to discover inconsistencies and contradictions
in the organization's espoused theories and its theories-in-
use. Thus, initial research questions were:
-Determining through analysis of organizational events
learning systems that fostered conflict, along with
those that fostered the suppression and denial of
conflict.
-Determining congruence between espoused theories and
theories-in-use while observing where features of Model
0-I principles of organizational learning were present.
The purpose in using this model was not to test or verify
8the theory but rather to use it to explain what was going on
in the organization under study.
A variation of intensive, semistructured
interviewing, was the principal method used for primary
data gathering. Willamson et al. note that
"semistructured interviews include questions that are asked
of all respondents (either in structured or nonschedule form)
as well as other, unstructured questions . . . it provides
some data that are comparable for all respondents . . . and
other data derived from questions tailored to the unique
6
experiences and perspectives of each individual."
Six organization members occupying different positions
from the art, teaching, and administrative staffs of both the
school and the company were interviewed. Five of the six had
been interviewed ten months earlier in 1984. There were four
brief telephone interviews. Two were conducted with
organization menbers who had been interviewed earlier and
where it became necessary to obtain additional information
to fill in data gaps. The other two were conducted with
former employees. On the average, the intensive interviews
were two hours in length. For those conducted face-to-face,
a tape recorder was used. Thirty-one interview questions
were prepared and formulated in such a way as to focus
primarily on the areas related to events of substantive
organizational conflict and change, growth, and development.
Secondary sources included examining selected publications
9on organizational theory, such as, conflict, behavior,
change, development, and substantive issues of organizational
conflict. Also, literature on the art form of ballet,
performing arts organizations, and nonprofit organizations
was reviewed. Public documents, newspapers, magazine, and
journal articles were also reviewed.
In an effort to explore, explain, and understand the
nature of organizational conflict, responses to interview
questions were analyzed based on conceptual themes of
organizational conflict inherent in the interview questions.
Once theme responses were identified and categorized, they
were written up in a quasi-case study form with attributed
statements of organization members presented to focus on
certain problems. While statements are attributed to
various organization members, they, of course, remain
unidentified. In most instances events are presented within
a chronological time frame. At times, however, sequences of
time are broken in order to highlight significant events or
problems.
The quasi-case form description and discussion of events
are not only a presentation of significant events told to me
by persons interviewed, but also a reflection of where I
thought and felt my research inquiries would find answers.
Focusing on the five reflections of events resulted from
sorting the interview data and separating it based on the
dominant themes that emerged during this process, and looking
10
again and again through the emerged themes for substantive
issues of organizational conflict. Interviews were conducted
while conflict was either in the stages of being suppressed,
fought over, mediated, or solved.
Finally, Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems was used
to explain the Boston Ballet as a limited learning system by
"guiding the mapping and diagnosis" of significant events
that evolved and persisted around specific cycles of
conflict. The model also aided in explaining some of the
conditions and processes of conflict, how conflict is viewed
and handled, and how an organization learns at different
stages in its life.
The structure of this paper reflects the stages of my
research. Chapter two first reviews the literature related
to the problem of organizational conflict in a nonprofit
performing arts organization. Second, this chapter considers
elements of Argyris and Schon's Model 0-I: Limited Learning
System. This conceptual model is used as a theoretical
framework for explaining organizational conflict at the
Boston Ballet. Chapter three sketches the history of the
Boston Ballet. This historical sketch looks at the growth,
development, and change of a ballet school and company over
the past fifty years with particular reference made to
biographical events that evolved around the organization's
founder. Chapter four is a chronological summary of major
events that occurred throughout the history of the Boston
11
Ballet. The next section, chapter five, presents the
interview data in a quasi-case form that describes events,
incidents, and episodes. These events are based on the
perceptions and comments of organization members, and are
separated into five categories: A "Meddling" Board of
Directors, the Artistic/Management Dichotomy, Financial
Instability, Teaching Styles in the School, and the Lack of
Studio Space. This chapter is followed by an overview that
looks at some of the features of conflict-in-development that
were discovered in the process of reviewing the data. The
last section, chapter six, is an explanation of my research
findings. Here an attempt is made to present my overall
findings in a way that will contribute to solving problems
of organizational conflict in a number of organizational
environments.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This first section, the literature on organizations,
nonprofit organizations, change, growth and development
in organizations, performing arts organizations, the
organizational environment, conflict, responses to conflict,
and theory-based principles of problem-solving is used to
explore and explain the phenomena of organizational conflict.
The review of these topics proceeds in the same sequence as
presented here. The second section reviews features of
Argyris and Schon's theory-based technique of problem-
solving, Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems. This model
is used as my theoretical framework for exploring and
explaining the problem of organizational conflict at the
Boston Ballet.
Before looking at the components and concepts of
organizational conflict, first, let us take a look at what
an "organization" is. Borrowing from the work of Etzioni,
"organizations are social units (or human groupings)
deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific
goals. Corporations, armies, schools, hospitals, and
prisons are included; tribes, classes, ethnic groups,
friendship groups, and families are included. They are
12
13
characterized by: 1) divisions of labor, power, and
communication responsibilities, divisions which are not
random or traditionally patterned, but deliberately planned
to enhance the realization of specific goals; 2) the presence
of one or more power centers which control the concerted
efforts of the organization and direct them toward its
goals; these power centers also review continuously the
organizations performance and repattern its structure,
where necessary, to increase its efficiency; 3) substitution
of personnel, i.e., unsatisfactory persons can be removed
and others assigned their tasks. The organization can also
1
recombine its personnel through transfer and promotion."
Etzioni further suggests that, "organizations are much more
in control of their nature and destiny than any other
2
grouping."
Shepard observes that, "organizations, like persons,
can be viewed as organisms, whose parts are living and in
communication. Organizations can be understood as learning
and adapting, as being and becoming. If one takes this
view, then change is to understood in terms of development
and regression, of health and illness, adaptive and
maladaptive processes. And the social science practitioner
needs concepts, methods, and criteria of development and
3
adaptation that are not culture-bound or power-bound."
With reference to this study, to particular types of
organizations, and to how they are viewed and understood,
14
Wolf, in discussing nonprofit organizations, outlines four
characteristics common to nonprofit organizations. He
suggests that:
1. They must be incorporated and they must have a
public purpose.
2. Their governance structure must preclude self-
interest and private financial gain. -
3. They must be exempt from paying federal tax.
4. They must possess the special legal status that 4
stipulates gifts made to them are tax deductible."
Wolf adds that, "there can be no owners in a nonprofit
organization because such an entity is intended to serve a
broad public purpose and the law is clear in specifying
that ownership (with concomitant private gain) is
incompatible with public purpose ... but the money that is
taken in must be directed toward the public purpose for
which the organization was set up or, if this is impossible,
held in reserve or turned over to another organization with
15
a public purpose."
In describing the four characteristics of nonprofit
organizations and the consequent challenges facing those
that govern and manage them, Wolf notes that a great dilemma
for the nonprofit organization is determining: "Which is more
important? To assure the continuity and the survival of
the organization? Or to stay true to the organization's
mission even if this involves certain financial and
6
institutional risks?" Questions of organizational
15
survival versus public service are often sources of conflict
in nonprofit organizations. Not surprisingly Starbuck notes
that, "the importance of survival to an organization can not
be overstated--at least as a logical necessity. An
organization may not impart prestige, power, and security
to its members. It may not do many things. But one thing
which it must do, if it is to be an organization at all,
7
is survive." Starbuck's observation is of particular
interest here since a number of different kinds of nonprofit
organizations have histories of financial instability,
including the Boston Ballet.
Weeks suggests that, "the first internal goal which
organizations seek ... is the reduction of conflict between
8
organizational goals." Returning to Wolf's discussion of
choices between risks and compromises, he notes that, "the
tug between these two competing tendencies is constant in
the nonprofit environment, and it becomes extreme when
organizations are under pressure, when funds are scarce,
9
and when there is lack of agreement about basic purpose."
In discussing change innovation, growth, and
development. Zaltman et al. state that, "it is important
to distinguish between innovation and organizational change.
Innovation is any idea, practice, or material artifact
perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption.
Change, on the other hand, is the alteration in the structure
and functioning of a social system. All innovations imply
16
change. Not all change involves innovation since not
10
everything an organization adopts is perceived as new."
On organizational growth and development, Starbuck, for
example, states that, "growth is defined as change in an
organization's size when size is measured by the
organization's membership or employment; development is
11
defined as change in an organization's age." Essentially,
the story of the Boston Ballet is a story of growth and
development in a nonprofit performing arts organization--
often amidst conflict that evolved either because of or as
a result of organizational change growth, and development.
Of interest, Starbuck reviews ten organizational
goals that "with varying degrees of validity are related to
12
growth." Of equal importance, he discusses the bases for
organizational growth: "Three of these goals are rooted in
the self-interest of individual organizational members: the
urge for adventure and risk, the desire for higher for
prestige, power, and job security, and the desire for
higher executive salaries. Three are rooted in the problems
and aesthetics of managing an organization: the desires for
a stable environment,, for 'organizational self-realization'
and for organizational survival. And four are rooted in
organizational purpose and effectiveness: the desires for
high profit and revenue, and low cost, and for monopolistic
13
power."
In describing some common characteristics of open
17
-systems, Katz and Kahn note that, "the most common type of
growth is a multiplication of the same type of cycles or
subsystems-- a change in quantity rather than in quality ...
a social system adds more units of the same essential type
as it already has ... Qualitative change does occur, however,
in two ways. In the first place, quantitative growth calls
for supportive subsystems of a specialized character not
necessary when the systems are smaller. In the second place,
there is a point where quantitative change produces a
qualitative difference in the functioning of a system. A
small college which triples its size is no longer the same
institution in terms of the relation between its
administration and faculty, relations among the various
14
academic departments, or the nature of its instruction."
In outlining the history of the phenomenal growth of
the performing arts between 1957 and 1975 and some of the
problems that accompanied that growth, Lowry says that
expansion of the symphony, opera, theater, and dance between
1957 and 1975 had no precedent in any similar period in
any country. He points out that, "how this expansion
was brought about is ... better understood than why it
15
began when it did." Inquiry into four case histories
that focus on symphony, opera, theater, and ballet for the
purpose of investigating the growth and development that
occurred in performing arts organizations between 1957-1975
reveals that during that time Ford Foundation with its huge
18
assets was largely responsible for that growth and
development. In 1957 the Ford Foundation began its
program in the performing arts and "since then has devoted
16
an average of about 4 percent of its grant to this area."
Also, "in 1963 the Ford Foundation began a national program
in ballet that eventuated in the investment of $29.8
million, ... Since that date every professional ballet'
company of minimum size, and performing season has been
involved in the Ford Foundation's program, most for as
17
long as twelve to fourteen years." Lowry also notes
that the source or "chosen instrument for expansion in the
18
performing arts area has been 'unearned income'"
Arian in selecting the Philadelphia Orchestra as a
subject of a case study that focuses on problems of
bureaucratization in a nonprofit performing arts
organization notes that, "a phenomenon associated with
bureaucracy is the allocation of status, prestige, or
financial reward in a manner calculated to control
personnel and reduce conflict with the organization over
19
the conditions of their environment." Bureaucracy
here is thus viewed as a mechanism for structuring both
efficiency and control. Arian remarks that, "the problems
revealed by this study are not peculiar to the Philadelphia
Orchestra, but are widespread throughout the American
20
cultural scene." He argues that "a commonality of
problems" can be recognized by those studying leading
19
performing arts organizations in cities across the country.
For instance, problems arose when the Philadelphia
Orchestra changed from one controlled by a charismatic
musical director to one where a more cooperative, Board-
controlled, "organization man" became the musical director.
Problems also arose when it lost the support of its principal
financial supporters during the Great Depression and upon
implementation of the progressive income tax. Arian
further points out that bureaucratic practices, such as
"emulating astute business practices of economy and
21
efficiency ... have exacted a high toll." He notes,
the artistic quality of the Orchestra's programming
and the education of its audiences have suffered;
it has neglected a responsibility to American culture
by largely ignoring modern music and catering instead
to the conservative musical tastes of its upper class
audience; the spectrum of concert artists presented
has been restricted; its musicians have been exploited
in various ways with a resultant lowering of morale
and worsening of labor relations; and finally, it has
neglected the musical education of the young and
served the cultural needs 2 f only a small and narrow
segment of the community.
Thus, two major costs of bureaucratization include the
domination of organization leadership by board members and
worker alienation. Arian contends that these costs "now
pose a real threat to the future existence of the
23
organization." Notwithstanding these problems that are
sources of internal conflict, Arian, in concluding his case
study, offers measures to aid in solving problems of the
24
Philadelphia Orchestra.
20
Gelles' case history is a description of the
development of the Pennsylvania Ballet, its director,
Barbara Weisberger, how it came into existence in 1962-1963
with the aid of Ford Foundation monies, and how problems
persist despite its "enviable record of growth, being well-
25
managed administratively, and artistically well-defined."
Gelles notes that the Boston Ballet directed by E. Virginia
Williams and the Pennsylvania Ballet directed by Barbara
Weisberger "were in effect brought to life by the Ford
26
Foundation grants." Kendall emphasizes that "the
Boston Ballet and Philadelphia Pennsylvania Ballet were
two of the more successful ventures of the 1963 grant action.
The initial troubles of these two companies came from the
old money in those cities-- . . . When the ballet came
on the scene in Boston and Philadelphia, it had to beg:
Bostonians and Philadelphians supported symphonies, operas,
and museums--familiar cultural institutions--but ballet was
27
new to them."
Thus the environment in which an organization functions
and the way it functions within that environment is an
important element in determining the relationship an
organization has with its environment and vice versa and in
identifying those physical and social factors that weigh
heavily in discovering conflict phenomena in the
organization.
Zaltman et al. in their work on innovations in
21
organizations concisely define the organization environment
as "the totality of physical and social factors that are
taken directly into consideration in the decision-making
28
behavior of the individuals in the organization." In
differentiating between the external and internal
environment they note that "the internal environment
consists of those relevant physical and social factors within
the boundaries of the organization or specific decision
unit that are taken directly into consideration in the
decision-making behavior of individuals in the system . . .
The external environment consists of those relevant physical
and social factors outside the boundaries of the organization
or specific decision unit that are taken directly into
consideration in the decision-making behavior of individuals
29
in that system."
Using Coser's classical definition of "social conflict"
as a preliminary operational definition in identifying
organizational conflict, "social conflict" is viewed as
"a struggle over the values and claims to scarce status,
power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are
30
to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." Of
equal interest, Thompson cogently states that, "conflict
may be simply a result of inability to put oneself in
31
another's place." Several of the Simmel-based
32
propositions discussed by Coser believed to be of
relevance when exploring some of the major events of the
22
Boston Ballet will be considered in the investigation. A
sketch of several of these propositions that describe some of
the functions of conflict include:
- Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity
and boundary lines of societies and groups. (p 38)
- Conflict is not always dysfunctional for the
relationship within which it occurs; often conflict
is necessary to maintain such a relationship.
without ways to vent hostility toward each other,
and to express dissent, groups might feel completely
crushed and might react by withdrawl. (p 47)
- Social systems provide for specific institutions
which serve to drain off hostile and aggressive
. sentiments. These safety-valve institutions help
to maintain the system by preventing otherwise
probable conflict or reducing its disruptive
effects. (p 48)
- Aggressive or hostile 'impulses' do not suffice to
account for social conflict. Hatred, just as love,
needs some object. Conflict can occur only in the
interaction between subject and object; it always
presupposes a relationship. (p 59)
- Realistic conflict need not be accompanied by
hostility and aggressiveness. 'Tensions' in the
psychological sense are not always associated with
conflict behavior. Yet it might be useful to hate
the opponent. The propagandist expects that such
hatred will reinforce the emotional investment in
the conflict and hence strengthen the readiness to
carry it out to the end. (pp 59-60) *Coser suggests
that "realistic conflicts" which arise from
frustration of specific demands within the
relationship and from estimates of gains of the
participants, and which are directed at the presumed
frustrating object, ... Non-realistic conflicts on
the other hand, although still involving the
interaction between two or more persons, are not
occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but
by the need for tension release of at least one of
them. (p 49)
- Close social relationships, characterized as they are
by frequent interactions and involving the total
personality of the participants, may be said to
23
include in their motivational structure an essential
ambivalence in that they contain both positive and
negative cathexes inextricably intertwined. (pp 64-65)
- Conflict with another group leads to mobilization of
the energies of group members and hence to increased
cohesion of the group. (p 95)
- The absence of conflict cannot be taken as an index
of the strength and stability of the relationship.
Stable relationships may be characterized by
conflicting behavior. Closeness gives rise to
frequent occasions for conflict, but if the
participants fell that their relationships are
tenuous, they will avoid conflict, fearing it might
endanger the continuance of the relationship. (p 85)
Katz suggests that, "without conflict, however,
there would be few problems, little stimulation, and
little incentive for constructive effort. Organizations
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without internal conflict are on their way to dissolution."
Mack and Snyder argue that, "in general, it might be expected
that the more central conflict is to the operations of a
group of organization, the more highly developed will be the
techniques of conflict waging. For groups and organizations
whose missions are not primarily conflict-directed, conflict
34
avoidance or quicker resolution might be expected."
Some possible responses to conflict range from
suppression and total war to limited war and bargaining to
problem-solving. Shepard's continuum table shows how
methods of conflict management can range from "primitive"
35
methods to "civilized" methods. Primitive methods are
classified as destructive and range from limited war to
bargaining, and civilized methods, according to Shepard and
24
others, are "not yet attained" and involve problem-solving
as a productive way of managing conflict.
In determining whether or not organizational conflict
should be "managed" or "resolved", Boulding observes that
the phenomenon of organizational conflict is susceptible
to analysis and therefore advocates supporting "better
management of conflict" rather than "conflict resolution".
He states that, "'resolution' has an air of finality which
we do not mean to convey. We are not 'against' conflict.
It is indeed an essential and, for the most part, useful
element in social life. There is, however, a constant
tendency for unmanaged conflict to get out of hand and to
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become bad for all the parties." Not surprisingly then.
Shepard in considering suppression of conflict views the
organizational chart as a suppression chart because "in the
case of conflict, the organizational pyramid tells us who
37
can suppress whom." Therefore, "managing conflict"
through suppressive structures "may be a superficially
effective form of conflict resolution, particularly when
the suppressed party is much weaker than the suppressing
party. It produces compliance, but there is an unseen
cost in the reduction of the productivity of the suppressed
38
person or group." Thus Shepard in his discussion of
suppression as a means of handling conflict notes that,
"suppression remains society's chief instrument of handling
39
conflict."
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In terms of organizational conflict, Westrum and Samaha
suggest that, "organizational conflict exists when there is
some disagreement in the organization about: 1) what the
organization should be doing, 2) how it should be doing it,
3) what parts of the organization are responsible for each
task, and 4) what parts of the organization should have the
40
privileges or rewards." Leas and Kittlaus distinguish
"three major ways in which conflict is experienced:
41
intrapersonal, interpersonal, and substantive." In
attempting to explain events at the Boston Ballet I will
focus primarily on issues of substantive conflict even
though it is more than likely that instances or
manifestations of intrapersonal and/or interpersonal
conflict will present themselves. However, dealing
directly with those types of conflict is beyond the scope
of my research endeavors at this time. Briefly then,
intrapersonal conflict "is that struggle which a person
has within himself ... the contest that one has with
different parts of his self. ... Interpersonal conflict ...
is related to differences between people but is not
related primarily to issues. This is the conflict where
one person is striking against another primarily over
incompatibility as persons. This conflict is not generated
by what a person does or what he thinks about an issue, but
42
by how he feels about the other person."
In terms of substantive conflict, Leas and Kittlaus
26
point out that, "substantive conflict can be between two
individuals, or between an individual and a group, or
between groups. Substantive conflict has to do with
43
conflict over facts, means, ends, or values." In
borrowing from Tannenbaum and Schmidt's discussion on the
nature and management of differences that is included in
their study on Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral
Science Approach, Leas and Kittlaus categorize four kinds
of substantive conflict (or "differences") and suggest
that people may disagree on any one or more of these
issues: facts, goals, methods, and values. Thus, based
on Tannenbaum and Schmidt's characteristics of these four
kinds of substantive conflict, they include:
1. Conflict over facts. Disagreements occur because
individuals have different definitions of the
problem, are aware of different pieces of relevant
information, accept or reject different information
as factual, or have differing impressions of their
respective power and authority.
2. Conflict of goals. Disagreements over what should
be accomplished--the desirable objectives of a
department, division, section, or specific position
within the organization.
3. Conflict over methods. Disagreements about
procedures, strategies or tactics which would most
likely achieve a mutually desired goal.
4. Conflict over values. Disagreements over ethics--
the way power should be exercised, moral
considerations, assumptions about justice, fairness,
etc. These differences may affect the choice of
either goals or methods. 4 4
Additional terms that will help in exploring and
explaining events at the Boston Ballet are:
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1. Values. The term 'values' may refer to interests,
pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral
obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions, and
many other modalities of selective orientations. 45
2. Norms. A norm is a rule, standard, or pattern of
action ... The norms are the standards of
reference by which behavior is judged and approved
or disapproved. A norm in this sense is not a
statistical average of actual behavior but rather
a cultural (shared) definition of desirable
behavior ... A norm calls for 'right action' and
implies a generalizable reason for the rightness
of the indicated conduct. Ultimately this
propriety or rightness traces back to some
standard of value that is taken without further
justification as valid by the individual or group
in question ... At the same time, norms actually
can guide conduct only if they prescribe or
proscribe identifiable courses of action;
therefore norms are more specific and socially
imperative than values or ideals. 4 6
3. Role. The term 'role' continues to be used to
represent the behavior expected of the occupant of
a given position or status ... In this definition
two features are emphasized: (1) expectations (i.e.,
beliefs, cognitions) held by certain persons in
regard to what behaviors are appropriate for the
occupant of a given position, and (2) enactments
(i.e., conduct) of a person who is assigned to, or
elects to enter, a given position. 47
Turning again to organizational theories designed to
either increase effectiveness, enhance cooperation, encourage
communication, or manage, reconcile, or resolve conflict,
Blake and Mouton point out that theory-based methods of
problem-solving are "for facilitating a change from current
48
practices to a more systematic way of doing things."
However, selecting a specific technique to use in a given
organization should be done with care.
Lawrence and Lorsch in studying types of organizations
28
effective in dealing with various economic and market
conditions found in their comparative study of several types
of competing industries that, "managers in all the
organizations studied almost unanimously saw confrontations
49
as the most desirable mode of conflict resolution."
On the other hand, they also found that confrontation "is
50
used much less than it is recommended." This apparent
contradiction is "explained by the assumption that people
have the requisite knowledge, but have a personally-based
51
aversion to confronting differences sharply." Their
study also "offers a reminder that people may also not
confront conflict because they do not have the requisite
52
knowledge and yet feel a need to be influential."
When people have a personality-based aversion to
confronting differences management development techniques
designed to remedy this problem could be utilized. The
Managerial Grid."provides a set of contrasting theories
depicting different ways of dealing with others. Grid
concepts enable individuals to gain insight into their own
power/authority dynamics. A typical first step in this
process involves the client describing his or her
managerial behavior in boss-subordinate situations.
Secondly, the individual studies The Managerial Grid in order
to gain insights into those issues that are systematically
clarified. This is initially accomplished through reading,
but recurs later in an organized seminar situation where
29
participants, through intensive team interactions, have an
53
opportunity to observe one another's grid styles." Thus
The Manageria1 Grid provides a framework for comparative
thinking about alternative approaches to management and
supervision, along with identifying thirteen approaches
54
that are being used in organizations today.
Before continuing to discuss theory-based techniques
that are used in solving problems of organizational
conflict, it should be noted that Lawrence and Lorsch,
while recognizing the value of techniques that facilitate
organizational change, argue that while training methods
can improve interpersonal competence and the ability to
confront conflict to some extent, training experiences
do not alter the manager's underlying personality
characteristics even though they can alter expectations of
themselves and others about what is legitimate behavior
to the point that they are encouraged to behave more openly
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and to resolve conflict more effectively. Mere
recognition of "legitimate behavior" is indeed quite an
accomplishment and thus a step towards resolving conflict
in the organization.
Kotter suggests that, "as organizations become more
complex, managers need help in diagnosing what is going on
56
both internally and externally." Kotter's method for
improving organization effectiveness involves using a model
designed "to lead the manager through a systematic
30
diagnostic process while revealing the inherent complexity
of organizations and the multiple interdependencies that
57
exist within them." In his study of twenty-six diverse
organizations during 1974 and 1975 where data collection
involved acquiring written information on each of the
organizations and interviewing top managers, along with
interviewing a number of well-informed insiders and
outsiders, Kotter used a descriptive model made up of
seven major elements: a central "processes" and six
"structural" elements. In turn, relevant questions
were asked to obtain information on the present
state of 1) the organization's key processes, 2) its
external environment, 3) employees and other tangible
assets, 4) formal organizational arrangements, 5) the
internal social system, 6) the organization's technology,
and 7) the dominate coalition. These questions were
posed not only to obtain comprehensive answers but to
encourage "a sensitivity to the potential relevance of
each element, variable, or question highlighted in the
model which when combined with an understanding of how
these elements and variables tend to interact, can be
enormously helpful to both managers and organization
specialists, especially those trained from a specialized
58
point of view." This apparently useful model also takes
into consideration time frames, i.e., the short run of hours
to a few months, the moderate run of a few months to a
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few years, and the long run of a few years to a few decades.
each time frame focuses on a different but specific
relationship between the six structural elements and the
organizational processes. For example, if I were to study
events of the Boston Ballet within the short-run time
frame, the focus would be on "cause-and-effect
relationships" among the six structural elements and the
organizational processes, in focusing on the moderate run,
the focus would be on the relationships among the six
structural elements and the concept of alignment, and in
the long run, "More diverse types of people tend to be
employed. More formal arrangements usually appear. A
larger more diverse task environment is developed. A more
complex internal culture emerges. Additional technologies
are incorporated. The size and complexity of the dominant
59
coalition increase." Thus, the focus would be on
"considering what elements if any are acting as 'driving
forces', and what level of adaptability is built into
60
the system." "Driving forces" are any one or two
elements in the model that are clearly more influential
61
than the others.
A unique feature of a theory-based approach to
organizational problem-solving is that this approach can
"provide such a powerful basis for changing behavior (i.e.,
changing behavior to facilitate solving organizational
problems) because mainly the theories are written out
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and open to public discussion. They are objective in the
sense of being subject to external validation and
verification not only against research and experimental
evidence but in personal terms as well. In other words,
62
they derive strength from demonstrated utility."
Finally, all theory-based organizational improvement
techniques focus on problems of conflict, (i.e., Blake and
Mouton's The Managerial Grid, Likert's System 4 Theory,
Argyris and Schon's Models I and II, Vroom and Yetton's
Model A and Model B, Transactional Analysis, Kotter's
Organizational Dynamics Model, and McGregor's Theories X
and Y). Blake and Mouton point out that these theories
have both similarities and differences, but "the most
characteristically shared feature is their common emphasis
upon the importance of conflict as a significant issue that
can strengthen or weaken relationships, depending on how
63
it is dealt with." They say that "all theory-based
approaches deal with this fundamental issue in one way or
64
another." Again, they say that the basic approaches for
dealing with conflict involve the five possibilities of
suppression, smoothing, withdrawal, compromise and
65
accommodation, or confrontation. Not surprisingly,
they contend that The Grid "which identifies a
number of different ways of dealing with conflict, is the
66
approach which most concentrates on conflict resolution."
However, based on my review of the literature, I have
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chosen one of Argyris and Schon's theory-based organizational
models, Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems, as a theoretical
frame of reference from which to examine and explain
interview data gathered from the Boston Ballet. This model
is discussed in the next section.
A Theory of Action Perspective:
Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems
In exploring organizational conflict in a nonprofit
performing arts organization, it is assumed a priori that
conflict exists in all organizational environments. A
theoretical generalization is thus made that conflict
exists in all social systems where people come together
and interact with one another in a number of different and
complex ways. It is also assumed that organization
members spend an inordinate amount of time and an
excessive amount of energy in dealing with (and not dealing
with) problems of conflict internal and external to the
organization. As noted earlier, some of the ways of
dealing with problems of conflict include: suppressing,
smoothing, withdrawing, compromising, accommodating,
confronting, and even physical fighting. At times, conflict
is also dealt with by using problem-solving techniques of
organizational learning.
In thinking about conflict in a nonprofit performing
arts organization against a background of change through
growth and development, conflict may be defined as a
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struggle between individuals, between individual and a
group, or between groups, over issues that are important
to them.
My intent is to look at problems that evolved and
persisted around major issues of substantive conflict at
the Boston Ballet; to discover the sources of conflict and
the participants involved at different stages throughout
the organization's history; to learn why subjects and
issues of conflict occurred at particular stages in the
organization's life; to determine whether or not the
dominant actors in the conflicts remained the same over
time, i.e., to discover the actors--who they were, what
they did, and what they fought over; to learn and attempt
to understand how an organization that had a history of
back-to-back situations of crises continued to survive
and thrive (or appeared to thrive) despite a history of
a reoccurring series of conflicts. In addition, to learn
how organizational success is measured. Is it measured by
an organization's existence? An finally, to learn how
organizations learn.
In thinking about answers to these questions shaped
and based on organizational events that surfaced as
persistent examples of conflict, and in looking for reasons
why these events occurred again and again, it became
necessary to look at these issues from a perspective that
would guarantee at least some answers. The prospect of
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viewing these problems from a variety of perspectives
commands interest, however, such research efforts are
both well beyond the scope of this paper and well beyond
the reach of my present research endeavors. Therefore, I
have chosen one perspective from which to explore the
problem of organizational conflict.
In searching for answers to questions of conflict-in-
development, conflict-in-change, conflict-in-growth at the
Boston Ballet features of Argyris and Schon's Model 0-I:
Limited Learning Systems were used to look at these
historical events from a theory-based perspective of
organizational problem-solving. Based on a theory of
action perspective, this model will also guide
understanding, predicting, and thinking about solutions to
organizational problems of conflict at the Boston Ballet.
Argyris and Schon's theory of action conceptual
framework consists of four models: Model I Theory-in-Use,
Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems, Model II Theory-in-Use,
and Model 0-11: Learning Systems. Model 0-I was specifically
chosen to use as a frame of reference to guide exploring,
examining, and explaining events at the Boston Ballet for
the following reasons: 1) it is assumed the model "holds"
for the Boston Ballet mainly because it is believed that
the Boston Ballet is a classic example of a limited
learning system, 2) the model "holds for mature
organizations" and it is believed that the Boston Ballet is
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a mature organization based on Kotter's three time frames,
3) it will help in determining the extent to which the
0-I model is representative of the Boston Ballet, 4) it
will aid in learning what really goes on in organizations,
that is, to uncover underlying causes, 5) it will direct
the focus on organizational theories-in-use rather than
on individuals' theories-in-use as would be the case in
using Model I Theory-in-use, and 6) it will aid in
uncovering those factors that inhibit and those that
facilitate organizational learning.
To maintain accuracy in reviewing features of the model
and to explain these features in a clear and concise way,
let me begin by quoting the model's authors. According to
Argyris and Schon, Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems is
a "model of organizations whose learning systems are
conducive to limited learning--a model of organizations
which are unlikely either to correct first-order error by
double-loop learning or to inquire into their own learning
67
systems." In explaining the features of the model,
(see Figure 1) Argyris writes that, "Figure 1 displays a
Model 0-I learning system (0 is for organization).
Reverse arrows along the bottom indicate feedback loops
that close the system. The order of columns, from left to
right, and the numbered arrows in the reverse direction
show the interaction effects that seem to us to be most
important. Complex as it is, the model is still
Figure 1. Model 0-I: Limited-Learning Systems
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oversimplified in a number of ways. For example, arrows
along the top might also have been numbered; secondary
loops to take one instance, lead not only to
correctable and uncorrectable errors (Column 7) but also
to camouflage of error (Column 8). Each Column has its
effect not only on the one immediately following but also
on others further down the line. However, as we have tried
to arrange the columns so that left-to-right order is a
68
reasonably good presentation of direct effects." In
continuing to discuss the causes and origins of limited
learning systems, Argyris notes that, "The model does not
describe the etiology of limited learning systems. Its
meaning is not, for example, that primary inhibitory loops
came first in the evolution of organizations and that they
later led to dysfunctional group and intergroup dynamics,
and so on. We think it more likely that a limited-learning
organization, at any period of its evolution, displays,
at least embryonically, the full configuration of the
69
system."
Continuing to explain features of this "systems
model", Argyris says that, "What the model does reveal is
the set of direct and indirect effects and feedback
loops that interconnect with the principal element of a
limited learning system. Given any column (such as
column 8, Camouflage), one can look to the left to find
its immediate and less immediate antecedent conditions
39
and to the right to find its immediate and less immediate
70
consequences." In pointing out the principal function
of the primary inhibitory loops, Argyris writes, "We begin
with primary inhibitory loops because they seem to us the
best starting point in order to explain a limited-learning
system and the best starting point for intervention. They
are 'primary' not in the sense of temporal order but in the
sense of their importance among the processes making up the
system. The model, then, has the principal function of
being a guide to mapping and diagnosis of limited-learning
71
systems."
In using Model 0-I to "map and diagnose" the Boston
Ballet and to explain my research findings, it is necessary
to take an even closer look at some of the features Argyris
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outlines in the model:
Column 4: Primary Inhibitory Loops: Elements of an
organization's instrumental theory of action are
inaccessible, unclear, or inadequate. One or more of
the features of the organizational theory of action
gives rise to error (Column 1). In a good dialectic,
such conditions of error would be confronted and
reduced through organizational inquiry. In a Model I
behavioral world, however, such conditions trigger
Model I interactions (Column 3), which reinforce
conditions for error or create new ones. Within
such loops, conditions for error become uncorrectable
and trigger the very responses that make them so. (p 91)
Column 5: Unawareness: Dysfunctional Dynamics.
Primary inhibitory loops reinforce unawareness of
their effect on organizational learning. ... Primary
inhibitory loops yield intragroup and intergroup
dynamics (secondary loops) that mirror and amplify
the properties of primary loops. These secondary
loops feedback, in turn, to sustain primary loops.
Sustained primary loops lead to the expectation that
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organizations are brittle and unchangeable. When
members despair of double-loop learning, the stage
is set for deception. (p 92)
Column 7: Correctable and Uncorrectable Errors.
The processes described so far do not prevent members
of an organization from detecting and correcting
errors in the first-order performance so long as that
detection and correction does not confront Model I
governing variables. Given the primary and secondary
loops characteristic of these living systems, however,
such errors become uncorrectable. Given the frame
of conditions for error and Model I theories-in-use,
efforts at error correction tend, in fact, to amplify
error. ... errors tend to be uncorrectable whenever
their correction entails double-loop learning--that is,
when norms central to organizational theory-in-use
would have to be questioned and changed ... also ...
errors tend to be uncorrectable when their correction
would threaten Model I governing variables--that is,
when it would require double-loop learning at the level
of the behavioral world. (p 72)
Column 8: Camouflage: In a Model I behavioral world,
discovery of uncorrectable error is a source of
personal and organizational vulnerability. The
response to vulnerability is unilateral self-protection,
which can take several forms. Uncorrectable errors and
the processes that lead to them can be hidden,
disguised, or denied (all of which we call camouflage),
and individuals and groups can protect themselves
further by sealing themselves off from blame should
camouflage fail. ... Camouflage may resort to espoused
theory ('We are open, trusting, and cooperative with
one another') in which everyone makes an open secret
of the incongruity ... Members of the organization
may make a public show of attacking the problem while
covertly sharing an understanding of the ritual nature
of that attack. ... Moreover, when camouflage and
protection are broadly practiced, they set the
conditions for a second layer of camouflage. (pp 92-93)
Column 9: Second-Order Loops that Inhibit Learning.
These are second-order loops that arise when
inquiring into an organization's first-order
activities. They are generated by the same kind
of factors--conditions for error, the Model I
behavioral world--that create primary and secondary
loops. And they feedback to reinforce both primary
and secondary inhibitory loops. (p 93)
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Column 10: Decreasing Probability for Double-loop
Learninlg; Increasing Double Binds for the Individual.
Double-loop learning depends on awareness of error,
which primary and deuterolearning loops prevent.
When errors are uncorrectable, they can not trigger
double-loop learning ... Members of limited-learning
systems might inquire into the features of their system
that make errors uncorrectable, except that
deuterolearning loops prevent inquiry. Hence, in
limited-learning systems, double-loop and
deuterolearning are unlikely. (p 93)
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In conclusion, key terms from Argyris and Schon's
book, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action
Perspective, that will facilitate understanding features
of Model 0-I: Limited Learning are listed:
- organizational learning system: an organization's
theory of action embedded in a behavioral world
which shapes and constrains organizational learning
about theory-in-use. (p 41)
- theory of action: a theory of deliberate human
behavior which is for the agent a theory of control
but which, when attributed to the agent, also
serves to explain or predict his behavior. (p 11)
- theory-in-use: the theory that actually governs a
person's actions is their theory-in-use, which may
or may not be compatible with their espoused theory.
The individual may or may not be aware of the
incompatibil.ity of the two theories. (p 11)
- espoused theory of action: the theory of action to
which a person gives allegiance, and which, upon
requests the person communicates to others. (p 11)
- organizational dilemma: the inability to resolve
conflict through inquiry. Sensitive issues are not
discussed in public. Inquiry into sensitive topics
is considered inappropriate. It involves the risk
of vulnerability to blame, and of interpersonal
confrontation. (p 38)
- deutero-learning: Learning about previous contexts
for learning. Reflecting on previous episodes of
organizational learning, or failure to learn. What
actions facilitated or inhibited learning.
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Inventing new strategies for learning, and evaluating
and generalizing about these strategies. The results
become encoded in individual images and maps are
reflected in organizational learning practice. (p 27)
- "good dialectic": the processes of organizational
inquiry which take the form of single- and double-
loop learning, as appropriate, and where ... both
single- and double-loop learning meet standards of
high quality inquiry. (p 42)
- single-loop learning: when error detected and
and corrected permits the organization to carry on
its present policies or achieve its present
objectives. (pp 2-3)
- double-loop-learning: when error is detected and
corrected in ways that involve the modification of
an organization's underlying norms, policies and
objectives. (p 3)
From this review of the literature on organizational
conflict and a look at Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems
and some of its features, we can now consider the growth
of a ballet company.
CHAPTER 3
THE GROWTH OF A BALLET
The Boston Ballet Company, formed only twenty-one
years ago, is an established professional company with
thirty-five professional dancers paid at union scale who
work about thirty weeks a year. They are in residence in
November, February, and April and when home perform in an,
oftentimes, too huge, restored, 4,200-seat old movie house.
The company has balanced repertoire of forty-three
classical and contemporary ballets, including thirteen
ballets given to them by the great George Balanchine, who
was artistic advisor to the company when it was formed in
1963. Older by about thirty years, its affiliate, the
Boston Ballet School, is not as well-established or as
well regarded as the company. The School does not "turn
out a uniformly trained corps" and is thus not considered
a great ballet school. A future goal of the organization
is to improve the school, form it as a separate organization
with it own board, and "separate the preprofessional
1
program from the other classes." It is also reported that
the school supported the company and the company's founder
when the company was a young dance troupe.
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Even though the company has a balanced repertoire, it
leans towards staging the big nineteenth century story
ballets, such as Swan Lake, Romeo and Juliet, Giselle,
The Sleeping Beauty, The Nutcracker, and Gaite Parisienne,
for instance, rather than the smaller repertoire works. The
Company was the first American Ballet company to dance in
the People's Republic of China since the Cultural Revolution.
It is reported that the City of Boston is proud of its
ballet company.
The Boston Ballet Company was formed September 1958 as
a not-for-profit organization and was then known as the
New England Civic Ballet of Boston. Its mission and
stated purposes outlined in its articles of organization are
that it "shall be a civic theatre dance company consisting
of advanced students, teachers, and professional dancers
and members of the allied arts who are joined together for
the benefit of this and neighboring communities. Its
purposes shall be forwarded by the giving of as many
performances as possible each year, both by itself and in
conjunction with other organizations such as civic
orchestras or operatic groups and the like, by commissioning
the composition of musical and choreographic scores and by
2
the granting of free memberships in the organization."
But the history of the Boston Ballet Company dates
back to an earlier time when E. Virginia Smith, founder of
both the original school and the company, opened her first
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dance school in Melrose and in three other suburban
communities, including Stoneham and Malden (her adopted
hometown) during the Great Depression--a time when one person
in four was unemployed. It is unknown if Williams was
employed by the Federal Dance Theater during this time but
for those students whose parents couldn't afford to pay,
Williams offered free classes. Commenting on Williams'
free classes, Kendall writes that, "When she opened her
first school in the mid-thirties, she bribed students
wanting 'tap and acrobatic' to take ballet lessons, by
offering the latter free. These classes, soon full, were
taught soundly and imaginatively, since Williams had made it
her business to find out from every possible source what
3
constitutes good ballet teaching."
Despite the hardships of the 1930s, there were
indications that the country would soon produce its own
ballet pioneers, for it was during that time that Lincoln
Kirstein, arts patron and "ballet-struck scion of a wealthy
Boston merchant family" invited George Balanchine, a
Russian expatriate, to help establish a ballet company,
ballet school, ballet repertoire, and ballet audience in
the United States. That effort eventually resulted in the
New York City Ballet and the School of American Ballet--
one of the outstanding companies and one of the outstanding
schools in the ballet world.
Also, between 1935-1938, the federal government put
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forth for the first time a "large scale effort" to support
performing arts in the United States, even though the
primary goal was to promote employment. The Federal
Theater Project and the Federal Dance Theater were
established to promote a nation-wide program of dance,
mainly modern, although some ballet and ethnic dance
were included. Balanchine fared considerably better
than the government-supported performing arts project,
for in 1938, the Dies Committee on Un-American Activities
launched an attack and charged employees of the two
projects as either being members of or sympathetic to
the Communist Party. In 1939 the Dies Committee destroyed
both projects.
E. Virginia Williams survived the economic tragedies
and hardships of the depression and in 1940 opened a dance
school in Boston--the town where earlier she had continued
her professional training and had danced professionally
with concert groups and in opera ballet. It is reported
that during the 1940s Williams' students began performing
in the Northeast as an informal concert group, and in 1950,
she rented the old Boston Opera House for student concert
performances. Recalling that venture, she is reported to
have said, "'It took me five years after the conference to
finish paying for it. I was very naive; we had a ten-hour
orchestra rehearsal, something unheard of. I didn't know
4
about overtime.'"
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Of interest, especially to people in the performing
arts world, was study undertaken by the Ford Foundation in
1957 to investigate the state of the country's performing
arts organizations and training institutions. W. McNeil
Lowry, former vice president, Division of Humanities and
the Arts, the Ford Foundation, travelled throughout the
United States visiting regional dance festivals to find out
who the best young dancers were and to determine whether
or not their instructors were the types of individuals
willing to keep their dance organizations running despite
a number of problems and obstacles. Often, he was
accompanied by Balanchine. It is reported that Lowry was
looking for, "People with 'that compulsive, hair-shirt
business of giving force to a collective' . . . He
emphasizes that his (and his foundation's) brand of
philanthropy was not to create something that wasn't there,
but to 'find people who have compulsion and drive, and
5
shorten history for then'"
If I were to describe Williams based on a mental
image of what a "compulsive, driven, hair-shirt type"
looks like, I most certainly would be accused of
stereotypic thinking and consequently run the risk of
creating an image based on such thinking-- an image in
fact quite different than Tobias' vivid description of
Williams. Writing in 1976 when she was sixty-two years
old, he wrote: "Her body is unprepossessing--rather short
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and rather squat--but moves with lightness and
precision, a description, come to think of it, of the way
she conducts her working relationships. She's got the
most elegant calves, ankles, and feet, as she deftly
demonstrates in class, you see where her company's
unerring sense of line comes from. Her face, especially
the gaze of the clear, sea-color eyes . . . is as
truthful as daylight. Her New England voice . . ., with
its broad A's and penetrating tone, makes fancy pretension
look like a waste of time. Being plain-spoken is her
6
charm." Even so, the characteristics and traits
Lowry and others were looking for, apparently, Williams
possessed, for the same writer continued: She has a
leader's vision, drive, and enduring stamina. There'd be
7
no Boston Ballet without that." She has also been
described as "a concerned mother" and "a spiritual
mother to dancers." The general consensus was that E.
Virginia Williams was a "no-nonsense New Englander."
Between 1958-1963 several events that would, according
to Lowry, "shorten history" while hastening the growth of
the company (and school) forced Williams to stop
choreographing, for in the process of "shortening history",
administrative duties and responsibilities increased and
consumed more and more of her time--necessary time away
from the work she most enjoyed, choreographing. As a
Choreographer, Williams in describing her work said, "'Music.
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Music was always the impulse. Then I liked to see a dance
that really moves, that covers space . . . I have a
8
sentimental feeling for lyrical dance.'"
Balanchine, artistic director and choreographer of
New York City Ballet--the first ballet company in the
United States to be accorded the status of a public
institution--and ballet master of the School of American
Ballet where 90 percent of New York City Ballet dancers
are trained saw the New England Civic Ballet of Boston
perform at the second and third Northeast Regional
Ballet Festivals in Erie, Pennsylvania and Dayton, Ohio
respectively. Several of Williams' students were taken into
the New York City Ballet. Williams has produced a number
of well-trained dancers. Reflecting on this during an
interview, she said, "'It sounds like boasting to say this,
but the dancers I trained usually passed their first
auditions; some of them went into companies even without
an audition, directly from my school. . . . at one point I
taught in and around Boston, and I was working fourteen
hours a day--and I started getting some very good
dancers. But after five or six years they left me,
because I couldn't make any professional performing
9
opportunities available to them.'"
It is important to also note at this point that,
"Williams' first quiet fame came from her teaching, which
is calm and logically paced, with the emphasis on elegant
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placement at the barre and on the dynamics really dancey
motion traveling in space. It is laced with humor . . .
She is matter-of-factly uncompromising when it comes to
technique and style--dancing's concerns; instinctively
warm and adaptable when it comes to dealing with each dancer
in a way that fits that dancer's personality--human
10
concerns."
Good news came in December 1963 when the Ford
Foundation, the single largest contributor to the arts
in recent years, announced it would begin a national
program in ballet in 1964 by giving grants totaling
$7,765,750 to nine leading ballet companies with the
lion's share, not surprisingly, going to Balanchine's
New York City Ballet and its affiliate, the School of
American Ballet. Table 1 provides supporting data. A
leading dance magazine reported that: "Believing in the
necessity of a single artistic force, the Ford Foundation
made this choice deliberately. It demonstrates their
conviction that Balanchine is the most significant
leader in the American Ballet." Others were less
generous and "there were instantaneous objections from
the non-Balanchine ballet world and from the modern the
11
modern dance spokesmen."
The Boston Ballet Company (the name was changed from
the New England Civic Ballet of Boston in June 1963) was
"granted $144,000 over a 3-year period for the purpose
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TABLE 1
*
1963 FORD FOUNDATION GRANT
Organization
New York City Ballet and its
affiliate, the
School of American Ballet
San Francisco Ballet
The National Ballet of Washington,
DC (now defunct)
Amount and Proviso(s)
$2,000,000 over a 10-year period
$50,000 for extending the
rehearsal periods;
$50,000 to enable company members
to perform as guests with
regional ballets, to do lecture-
demonstrations, etc.;
$50,000 to support a costume
workshop for Karinska at City
Center (with the NYCB having
first call on her output);
$50,000 for scenery and other
ballet production costs.
$644,000 over 10 years with a
proviso that the sum be matched
by $250,000 in new funds and that
the San Francisco Ballet Guild
maintain the existing level of
its contribution to the company.
Most of the Ford assistance goes
to establishing a more intensive
training program at the San
Francisco Ballet School and to
lengthening of contracts for a
nucleus of company dancers.
$400,000 over a 5-year period.
The grant requires matching
contributions of $500,00.
Half of the Foundation's funds
will be used to increase the
number of performances per
season from the present 17 to 70
by 1967-68, and to raising
company strength from 25 dancers
to 35. The balance goes toward
development of training at the
National Ballet School.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
1963 FORD FOUNDATION GRANT
Amount and Proviso(s)
The Pennsylvania Ballet
The Utah Ballet
(now Ballet West)
The Houston Ballet
The Boston Ballet
School of American Ballet
$295,000
$45,000 is allocated to training
and performance activities for
current season.
$250,000 (to be matched by
$500,000 from other
contributions) will assist in the
development of the school and the
company during the next decade.
$175,000 to be matched over a
5-year period by $100,00.
Funds will assist performances
and provide scholarships, thereby
maintaining a nucleus of
professional dancers in Salt
Lake City.
$173,750 for a 5-year period,
largely for training activities.
The amount is to matched equally
by local contributors.
$144,000 over a 3-year period for
the purpose of assisting its
transition from a semi-
professional to a professional
organization.
$1,5000,000 (an additional fund)
administered by a staff of 3 to
be used to give nation-wide
support to instruction at the
local level.
*
From Dance Magazine, January 1964, p. 3.
Organization
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of assisting its transition from a semi-professional
12
organization." Other ballet companies that received
grants were the San Francisco Ballet, the National Ballet
of Washington, DC (now defunct), the Pennsylvania Ballet,
the Utah Ballet (now Ballet West) and the Houston Ballet.
The "American ballet boom" had begun. With two
exceptions--President Eisenhower's signing of the law
creating a National Center for the Performing Arts in
Washington in 1958--and the great depression programs of
the 1930s, the federal government indeed had never supported
the arts in the United States in any significant way. In
1963, President Kennedy tried unsuccessfully to establish
a National Arts Foundation. However, in 1964, President
Johnson, signed a bill establishing within the Executive
Office of the President the National Council on the Arts,
an organization without the funds or the authority to
offer grants-in-aid but with a chairman and twenty-four
13
private citizens appointed by the President. Also, that
year, at the Boston Arts Festival, fourteen dancers
performed for the first time as members of the recently
incorporated Boston Ballet Company.
In 1965 the Boston Ballet gave its first professional
performance; and the Congress with the passage of the Arts
and Humanities Act that year established a National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities as an independent
agency in the executive branch "to encourage and support
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American arts' artists . . . by awarding grants and through
14
its leadership advocacy activities." "Its Dance Program
provides support for professional choreographers, dance
15
companies, and organizations that present and serve dance."
Its Dance Company Grants are "to help dance companies of the
highest artistic level and of national and regional
significance improve artistically, and increase their
16
visibility and community support." These "grants cover
such projects as commissioning new works; paying dancers
during rehearsal periods; touring; hiring administrative and
artistic personnel; launching promotional campaigns; and
17
documenting work through film, video, or notation."
Also, in 1965, the Rockefeller Panel Report in its
assessment of the future of theater, dance, and music in
America said about the dance: "From the standpoint of
finance, administration, and organization, the dance world
is close to chaos . . . At the moment not more than five or
six companies can claim both a national reputation and a
relatively stable institutional setup capable of surviving
a crisis. . . . In projecting the future pattern of dance
in America, there is urgent need for encouragement of
permanent companies that do exist and show potential for
growth--encouragement toward stability within their own
communities and encouragement to tour more widely than they
18
are now able to do." In 1966, a $300,000 Ford Foundation
19
grant established the Boston Ballet for good.
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It has been noted that the company managed its
transition from a regional group to a professional company
"with grace". The company's continued growth saw Samuel
Kurkjian joining the company initially as a dancer and
part-time choreographer and then becoming the resident
choreographer, ballet master, and second in command in 1967.
From 1970-1980 "when most companies were having their
20
growing pains" the company continued to grow with grace,
but it was becoming more apparent that the growing pains
were becoming more acute thus adversely affecting grace.
In 1970 the company received $350,000 from the Ford
Foundation. That year the company and the school moved
into newly renovated digs in the South End of Boston, an
area in the process of being regentrified. In 1971, on the
national level, NEA expanded its level of federal funding
while on the local level, the company made its first
national tour. Yet in 1971 the company's financial
situation was grim. There were problems with deficit
spending. The company was brought to a standstill. As a
result, the board created a management staff to handle
fund-raising, determine the budget, and the bookings. A
company manager and fund raiser were hired. A Ford
Foundation matching grant in the amount of $470,460 to
stabilize the Ballet was also received in 1971.
In 1972 "the new management hired an outside consulting
firm to research ways in which the Boston Ballet could
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21
broaden its appeal." Fanger suggests that this was the
first time a dance company . . . tried to put market
22
research to work to sell dance as a product and service."
Becker would argue that market research personnel are new
members of a collective who would now join others already
in the art world of ballet in producing a product through
cooperative activity, that is, staging ballets and what is
23
necessary to bring these works of art into existence."
Briefly, 1970-1975 may be viewed as a period of growth
and change. The company celebrated it Tenth Anniversary
Season 1973-1974. In 1975 Ford Foundation grants came to an
end. The company thus became conservative shifting
emphasis from an adventurous repertoire of both ballet and
modern choreographers to classics that the company hoped
would be big box office draws. In 1975 the board became
a "prestigious" board with the addition of a Cabot. It is
reported that, the very first board was composed primarily
of the dancers' mothers, women who pitched in with all their
24
time and energy. A mother recalled, "'We didn't have much
25
money to give, but Virginia gave us all jobs.'"
Since 1978, the company has received about $100,000 each
year from NEA. In 1979 a new resident choreographer, Bruce
Wells, was hired replacing Lorenzo Monreal who had succeeded
Kurkjian in 1973. Also, in 1979 the official school and
primary educational vehicle of the Boston Ballet was
acquired by the company. In other words, in 1979, the
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Boston Ballet School was formed as a nonprofit organization
and an affiliate of the company. And between 1979-1982 the
company toured the People's Republic of China, Israel,
Europe, throughout the United States, and in the Far East.
From 1980-1984 a number of events and structural
changes occurred that were instrumental in revealing what
Harrison calls the "character" of an organization. In 1980,
Violette Verdy, former New York City Ballet principal and
former director of the Paris Opera Ballet was appointed
co-artistic director. Williams, however, appeared to have
continued functioning as the artistic director and her
"suggestions" were usually followed where the choreography
of Verdy and Wells was concerned. Lewis reported that
Williams "very much involved" one day during a rehearsal
of Swan Lake leaped out of her chair and commenced
rearranging "swans". Lewis said: "What are the swans to
do when Virginia Williams pelts into the corps, grabbing
them by the wrists and moving them to where she wants them,
then decides they would look better in a double line? The
26
answer is obvious."
In 1981 the company began negotiations to send
eighteen dancers to perform in South Africa in the
Township of Soweto that June. Conditions set by the
Boston Ballet included "a fully integrated company playing
to integrated audiences, the whole company to be housed in
the same hotels, and the principal dancer Augustus Van
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Heerden, a Black born in South Africa be accorded all
27
rights and dignities under international law." Only
after public criticism was the proposed tour canceled. The
board suggested that "touring there didn't any more signify
support of apartheid than touring in China signified
28
support of communism."
In October 1982, Joel Garrick, former director of the
Brooklyn Center for the Performing Arts at Brooklyn College,
was appointed president of the Boston Ballet. Soon after,
in March 1983, Williams relinquished her post as co-artistic
director of the company and Verdy became the artistic
director. Williams now had the title of founder and
artistic advisor. Lewis observed while watching the
rehearsal of Swan Lake that, "though she hired Wells, Verdy,
and one assumes Julia Trevelyan Oman (set and costume
designer), she is not about to hand over the company to
29
anyone." In an interview at the time of her stepping
aside, Williams is reported to have said, "'I'm not
retiring to Florida, mind you: I'm only in my 60s and its
too early for that. I'll still be here, teaching in the
30
school, coaching and rehearsing.'" Williams coached,
rehearsed, and taught in the school for little more than
a year until she became ill and was hospitalized on April
30, 1984 for a circulatory ailment. She died in a hospital
in her adopted hometown of Malden, Massachusetts on May 8,
1984 as a result of complications following surgery.
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Tobias said in writing about the Boston Ballet that:
Despite intelligent reorganization, the financial
life, and thus the life, of the company is continually
a matter of adept brinkmanship. What with the troupe's
healthy, and, indeed, essential expansion and the
rampantly increasing cost of production, the Boston
Ballet, like so many comparable art enterprises,
lives from crisis to crisis.3 1
An ongoing "crisis to crisis" situation persisted
following the death of E. Virginia Williams. This situation
had been labeled a "dust storm", an "epic war", and a
"wartorn battlefield". After the company's first
full-length production of Romeo and Juliet, the music
director, David Commanday, left. On June 12, 1984, the
president, Joel Garrick, was "forced" to resign. On June
24, Violette Verdy resigned and the board accepted her
resignation that day. She had resigned immediately
following Williams' death but the board had refused her
resignation. In September, two "prestigious" board members
resigned. Following this exodus, Bruce Wells, resident
choreographer, was appointed interim artistic director. On
December 24, the Boston Globe essentially suggested that
the company eat crow when it reported not only that the
"American ballet boom had thudded to a stop" but also that
the Boston Ballet "was up for grabs".
Not quite. Without a chief executive, the board
assumed undaunted, a straight-out managerial role. On
January 6, 1985, the board appointed Bruce Marks,
choreographer, and former leading dancer with American
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Ballet Theater and Royal Danish Ballet, and recent artistic
director of Ballet West in Salt Lake City, artistic director.
Until Marks' appointment became official in June, Wells
continued functioning as interim artistic director and then
in June was appointed associate artistic director.
Marks, who will manage a budget of $4.9 million, has a
reputation as a "successful administrator". His stated goals
include turning the company into a great national company
with an eclectic repertoire while building on its stature as
a classical company. He believes the company's first
obligation is to the Boston and Massachusetts audience. A
major change planned during his appointment is to
disaffiliate the Boston Ballet School from the Boston
Ballet Company by establishing it as separate organization
with its own board--a move believed long overdue. Other
changes are in the wind. Marks said, "'It is not going to be
the old buddy club anymore. Boston deserves a real,
32
professional company.'"
CHAPTER 4
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS
?1930. E. Virginia Williams opens her first dance school
in Melrose, Massachusetts during the depression and
eventually opens schools in the Boston suburban
communities of Stoneham and Malden, the latter
community, her adoptive hometown. She offers
free classes to students whose parents cannot
afford to pay.
1933. George Balanchine arrives in the United States at
the invitation of Lincoln Kirstein, patron, to help
establish a ballet academy, a ballet school, a
ballet repertoire, and a ballet audience.
?1935- E. Virginia Williams studies with George
1936.
Balanchine.
1935- First "large-scale effort" by the federal
1936.
government to support the performing arts in the
United States--but primarily established to promote
employment during the depression. Music project
set up to assist symphony orchestras, musicians,
opera, and composers.
1936. Federal Theater Project and Federal Dance Theater
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sponsors performances, tours, and helps to
promote a nation-wide program of dance, mainly
modern, although some ballet and ethnic dance
is included. Choreography concerned either with
American folklore or with socially liberal and
minority-group themes.
1938. Dies Committee on Un-American Activities attacks
the Federal Theater Project charging its employees
as either being members of or sympathetic to the
Communist Party.
1939. The Federal Dance Theater and Federal Theater
Project destroyed by the House Dies Committee on
Un-American Activities.
1940. E. Virginia Williams opens a dance school in
Boston, the E. Virginia Williams School of Dance.
1953. Williams forms a performing unit made up of
advanced students. She rents the Boston Opera
House for a student concert performance. She
also begins full-scale choreographing.
1957. The Ford Foundation undertakes a five-year study
to investigate the state of the country's
performing arts organizations and training
institutions. W. McNeil Lowry, vice-president of
the arts at the Ford Foundation travels around the
country to learn where the best young dancers are
trained, who their teachers are, and to visit
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regional dance festivals in search of the people
running dance companies to see if they are the
types--"hair shirt types"--who will keep them going
despite seemingly insurmountable odds. Williams'
informal concert group begins touring the
Northeast.
1957- The Ford Foundation is the largest single
1964.
contributor to the arts.
1958. E. Virginia Williams' informal concert group
officially incorporated and becomes the New
England Civic Ballet of Boston. Williams uses
"New England" in the name because she is interested
in opening her company to students from other local
dance schools and also to students from dance
schools throughout the New England region.
However, many teachers are skeptical and suspicious
fearing that she will steal their best students.
Thus, her plan to have a real regionally-based
company is never realized.
1959. The New England Civic Ballet of Boston performs
at the First Northeast Regional Dance Festival in
Scranton and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
1960. Gifted students throughout the country receive
Ford Foundation scholarships for advanced training
in New York and San Francisco. Several of
Williams' students are taken into the New York
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City Ballet. Williams stops choreographing due to
administrative duties. The School has four faculty
members and one person performing secretarial and
managerial duties.
George Balanchine, director and choreographer of
the New York City Ballet and ballet master of the
School of American Ballet, and Lowry see the New
England Civic Ballet of Boston perform at the
Second and Third Northeast Regional Ballet
Festivals in Erie, Pennsylvania and in Dayton,
Ohio respectively.
Balanchine invites Williams to New York for
private coaching after seeing her group perform.
She travels to New York once a month for one year
for private coaching on technique, music,
choreography, and is also invited to sit in on
company classes and rehearsals. Sometime in here
Balanchine becomes Williams' mentor. Lowry
recommends Williams' work to the Ford Foundation.
Balanchine and Lowry visit the New England Civic
Ballet of Boston.
Williams alternately calls her company the New
England Civic Ballet of Boston and the Boston
Civic Ballet until Lowry advises her to name the
company the Boston Ballet. The new name becomes
official on June 18. Balanchine is designated
1960-
1961.
1960.
1963.
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artistic advisor to Williams. The Ford Foundation
announces (on December 19) it will begin a ten-year
national program in ballet designed to "strengthen
professional ballet in the USA". Approximately $8
million is given to eight ballet organizations:
The New City Ballet and its affiliated School of
American Ballet, The San Francisco Ballet, The
Pennsylvania Ballet of Philadelphia, The Utah
Ballet (now Ballet West), The Houston Ballet, The
National Ballet of Washington, D.C. (now defunct),
and The Boston Ballet. The Boston Ballet is
granted $144,000 over a three year period.
"Reactions are fierce." "Resentment and anger"
spring from nonrecipients--the established but
struggling ballet companies, the anti-Balanchine,
the modern dance world, the civic ballet companies,
and the dance world in the South and the Midwest.
1964. The National Council for the Arts is established
within the Executive Office of the President.
During the summer fourteen dancers give their
first performance as members of the Boston Ballet
at the Boston Arts Festival. In December the
company presents The Nutcracker for the first time
for one performance.
1965. In January the first official performance of the
Boston Ballet is given in John Hancock Hall.
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Congress creates a National Foundation on the Arts
and Humanities as an independent agency of the
executive branch of the federal government. The
foundation consists of the National Endowment for
the Arts, the National Endowment for the
Humanities, and the Federal Council on the Arts and
Humanities. The major goals of NEA are to foster
artistic excellence by helping to develop the
nation's finest creative talent, to preserve its
diverse cultural heritage, to make the arts
available to a wider, more informed audience, and
to promote the overall financial stability of arts
organizations.
1966. A Ford Foundation grant of $300,000 "establishes
the Boston Ballet for good". That is, the money
gives the company working capital, a cash flow
vehicle, that allows the organization to have
enough up-front cash to commit to producing
better-quality ballets which will, it is believed,
replenish the company financially through the sale
of tickets.
1967. Samuel Kurkjian joins the company as a dancer and
part-time choreographer. He becomes resident
choreographer, ballet master, and second in command
sometime in here.
1970. Company receives $350,000 from the Ford Foundation.
67
The Boston Ballet moves into a new facility in the
South End section of Boston.
1971. Somewhere between six and nine staff people and
twenty-five dancers are members of the
organization. The company goes on its first
national tour. In September "deficit spending"
and a "brinksmanship" method of dealing with
fund shortages brings the company to a standstill.
The board president "demands" that a professional
management team responsible to the board be hired
"to control the company's operations". A new
treasurer, company manager, accountant, and fund
raiser are hired. Williams is relieved of
administrative duties but continues on as artistic
director.
1971- The Ford Foundation gives approximately $8 million
1979.
to help ballet companies to stabilize their
financial positions.
1972. The Boston Ballet receives a $470,460 Ford
Foundation matching grant over a four-year period.
An outside consulting firm is hired to research
ways the company can broaden its appeal. There is
a 65 percent increase in donations from forty-five
different business organizations and foundations,
excluding the Ford Foundation, plus individual
gifts.
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1972- The company participates in NEA coordinated
1973.
Touring Residency Program.
1973- The company's tenth anniversary season.
1974.
1973. Lorenzo Monreal succeeds Kurkjian as the resident
choreographer and ballet master. The company
performs The Nutcracker in fourteen holiday
presentations.
1975. The Ford Foundation grant ends. The company
becomes more conservative. There is an emphasis
shift from an "adventurous" repertoire of ballet
and modern choreographers to the classics in order
to increase ticket sales. The board becomes a
"prestigious" board with the addition of Maryellen
Cabot.
1976. Williams is awarded the Dance Magazine Award for
outstanding contributions to American Dance.
1978. The company has thirty-two professional dancers
paid union scale wages, an apprentice program, a
repertoire of thirty ballets, and an orchestra.
1979. The First Boston Ballet Choreographers' Showcase
is established by Williams to invite choreographers
to set dances on the Boston Ballet for a cash
prize. Bruce Wells, now resident choreographer and
interim artistic director, is one of the six
finalists from the more than 250 entries.
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1980. The Boston Ballet Company, Inc. buys the Boston
Ballet School from Williams and it is incorporated
into the organization as a nonprofit affiliate of
the company. The First Summer Dance Program, an
eight-week course from June to September for
preprofessioanl and professional ballet students
between fourteen and twenty years old is held. The
Second Boston Ballet Choreographers' Showcase is
held. The company tours the United States and
makes its first appearance in New York City. The
company goes on its first (12-week) international
tour of the People's Republic of China (the first
American dance company to perform there since 1949)
and performs in Peking, Canton, and Shanghai. The
company also tours Israel, Italy, and France.
Touring turns into a financial loss. Violette
Verdy, former director of the Paris Opera Ballet
and a former principal dancer of the New York
City Ballet, is appointed co-artistic director
(in September) with Williams as the other
co-artistic director. Williams is named
Distinguished Bostonian as part of the City's
Jubilee 350.
1981. The company plans a South African Tour. Cancels
trip after public criticism.
1982. Joel Garrick is appointed president of the
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organization (in November). He is the former
head of the Brooklyn Center for the Performing
Arts at Brooklyn College. The roof of the
company's performance headquarters almost caves
in and the company has to move its biggest money
maker, (The Nutcracker) at a considerable financial
loss, to another facility.
1983. Williams relinquishes post as co-artistic
director of the organization (in March). Verdy
becomes the artistic director (in March).
Williams is now known as the founder and artistic
advisor. Balanchine, New York City Ballet
co-founder and "ballet master of America", dies.
Ballet superstar, Nureyev, injures leg and cannot
perform with the company as its main attraction
thus causing it to cancel its two-week run of
Don Quixote at a considerable financial loss.
1984. Williams dies May 8. David Commanday, music
director, resigns in May. Joel Garrick is asked
to resign, effective June 12. Verdy resigns on
June 24. Bruce Wells, resident choreographer and
principal dancer is appointed interim artistic
director on June 27. The company signs (in July)
a three-year lease with the Wang Center for the
Performing Arts that confirms a permanent
performance home. Two "influential" board
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members resign in September, Sunny Dupree and
Maryellen Cabot. John Humphrey, board chairman,
announces (in December) a new five-year strategic
plan for the organization that outlines its
mission, cost structures, and the roles of its
top management people--the board, the artistic
director, and the staff.
1985. Bruce Marks, former leading dancer with the
American Ballet Theater and the Royal Danish
Ballet and presently director of Ballet West in
Salt Lake City, is appointed (in January) by the
selection committee of the board as the Boston
Ballet's new artistic director. Chosen from among
fifty candidates his appointment becomes official
in June. He has a reputation as a gifted
organizer, administrator, fund-raiser, and image-
maker. He is also considered to be in the "modern-
ballet camp".
1985. The board announces (in February) its plan to make
the school a separate organization with its own
board of trustees. The move is designed to give
the school "an independent focus". The Company's
artistic director, Bruce Marks, announced (in
April) that Sydelle Gomberg, dean for the arts at
the Walnut Hill School of Natick, signed a contract
to become the director of the Boston School of
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Ballet, the affiliate of the Boston Ballet
Company.
CHAPTER 5
REFLECTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EVENTS:
THE BOSTON BALLET
This section will look at problems of substantive
conflict-in-development, conflict-in-growth, and conflict-
in-change. These segments, or if you will, sequences of
events, are reflections by organization members on the
incidents, and episodes that happened at specified
and unspecified times under different conditions and
involving different individuals. In a relative sense, they
all began at the same time, that is, when the organization
first came into existence; however, in a historical sense,
certain elements of events were more pronounced than others
within the same time frame of the organization's history.
The Boston Ballet, a nonprofit performing arts
organization, was characterized by its ability to survive,
despite a history of "living from crisis to crisis".
Throughout its more than fifty years of change, growth,
and development, certain problems of a substantive
nature persisted. They arose again and again, in recurring
cycles, during periods of significant organizational change.
The type of change, whether external or internal, the
individuals involved, and the organizational climate at
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the time, all combined to determine the extent, duration, and
intensity of the problems.
An awareness of the nature of these three elements,
the type of change, the individuals involved, and the
organizational climate will enhance discovery of why certain
problems associated with change evolve into recurring cycles
of crises situations. In other words, attempts at reading
these elements of organizational life may facilitate forming
mental images that aid in determining conditions where
problems of conflict may surface and thus become part of a
cycle of crises situations. These cycles of crises
situations occur when problems of a substantive nature
accumulate and become part of an organization's repertoire
of organizational problems. Consequently, they are always
present, yet, dormant. Whether or not they surface is
often dependent upon the kind of change proposed, the
individuals involved, the organizational climate at the
time of change.
It is mainly events of a conflictual nature that
emerged and reemerged at different times and under different
circumstances in the life of the organization and that are
reflected on by organization members. These events, that
began in 1971, simmered for more than a decade, and surfaced
in 1984, are the latest in a series of events that occurred
in what I would describe as "moment of truth" years. Thus,
an attempt is made to pinpoint events in terms of dates,
75
and although reflections are organized separately around
different "stories" of events based on substantive issues
of conflict, they too, similar to time and history, often
overlap and converge. The sense here is of time and history
woven together, converging and overlapping.
The following events are selected from the views,
experiences, and opinions of organization members who were
involved in and/or aware of incidents and events in their
organizational environment and who shared pictures of these
events. These will aid in uncovering linkages between
conflict phenomena, which may, in turn, help us understand
how organizations learn or fail to learn. These events or
reflections include:
1. Conflict because of a "meddling" and "overly-
powerful" board of trustees reportedly controlled
by an "inner circle".
2. Conflict between the artistic director and the
president and/or others in the organization, e.g.,
over the kinds of ballets in the repertoire to be
performed.
3. Conflict over a board of trustees unable to manage
the organization's deficit or to ensure a stable
financial future for the organization.
4. Conflict over the absence of uniformity in the
style of dance characteristic of the company and
the school.
5. Conflict between company dancers and students in
the school over insufficient and uncomfortable
studio space.
(Note: Quotation marks are also used throughout this chapter
when referring to words and phrases spoken or written by
others.)
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A Meddling Board of Trustees
Board members should be as carefully screened as
performers, and procedures for rotating membership
should be considered. The potential for serious and
prolonged damage to the organization is as high in the
board room as on the stage.1
The organization's very first board, about which little
is known, was assembled in 1958 when the New England Civic
Ballet of Boston, Incorporated was formed by nine
incorporators. These, I suspect, were the first board
members. The first board was made up mainly of parents,
friends, balletomanes, and friends of friends. Five years
later, in 1963, the New England Civic Ballet of Boston
adopted the name, the Boston Ballet Incorporated, and was
thus officially incorporated under law. The names of its
incorporators are unknown. It is unknown how many board
members there were at that time or if any of the first
board members automatically became members of the
Boston Ballet's board of trustees. However, upon reflection,
a former board member counted off thirteen names. "The
treasurer was a parent, Stanley Perry. The chairman was
Harry Wilcott. We had somebody else before him who was a
balletomane, Dr. William Stone. And there was a Mr. and Mrs.
Burlingame. They were wealthy people. A few balletomanes
who were brought in by friends of friends. Virginia
Dunton. Virginia Stuart was the name she used in the New
York City. Her mother, Liz Dunton was on the board for
years, and Marjorie Duff, who really ran Virginia's School
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in Malden as she got busier here in Boston. She had been
with Virginia all along. Mr. Hobbs, Miss Williams' husband,
and a couple of women who were sisters actually of Marjorie
Duff--who was a ballet mother, but her child had already
moved on to New York, Mrs. Harrington, who was Miss Williams'
secretary and assistant for the whole period practically."
In 1985, there were forty-four board members.
According to the corporate bylaws of 1963, the officers
of the corporation included a director (chairman) who
performed the functions and duties of a president, a
treasurer, a secretary, and a clerk. This governing board
was elected from the board of trustees. Section 3 of the
bylaws stated that, "the Board of Governors shall have the
control and management of the activities, policies, and
property of the corporation and shall have and exercise all
the powers conferred upon them or set forth in the charter
2
of the corporation . . ." In addition, to these general
powers, other powers include:
To acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise rights in
any property, either real or personal, that they may
deem necessary to the purposes of the corporation.
To borrow or raise money and execute notes of mortgages
for the same in the name of the corporation.
To provide for the management of the affairs of the
Corporation in such manner as they may think fit and in
particular to delegate such power and authority as the
laws of Massachusetts will permit to any committee,
officer or agent.
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At their discretion to appoint and remove committees,
agents and employees, determine their duties and fix
their compensation or may invest any officer or
committees of the corporation with any or all of the
powers in this sub-section.
To determine when, where and to what extent the books,
accounts and records of the corporation shall be open
to inspection by the members, except as otherwise
provided by the General Laws of Massachusetts.3
Thus, it is the Board of Governors with its "unlimited"
powers that is frequently referred to as the "inner circle"
by individuals both internal and external to the
organization.
I am now going to trace the historical development of
the Board and its relation to the company and school.
In the early days, powers written into the bylaws had
little impact on the organization as long as the founder
had the dominant voice. In his discussion on governance
and administration in performing arts organizations, Lowry
suggests that, "if an artistic director were really the
founder, even though without his or her own financial
resources, the trustees gave up on major control except
4
over the outside limits of budgetary planning". But as
the Boston Ballet grew and the founder's strength
imperceptibly became more diffuse, or eventually diminished,
the board raised its flag more and more; eventually,
organization members were saluting.
In 1971, when the board chairman "demanded" that
Williams relinquish her administrative duties, Williams'
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influence started to wane--at second glance--perhaps not so
imperceptibly. In exercising their right to demand that
change, the board for the first time since assembling in
1958 was demanding innovative change in organizational
structure and roles. This act was not lost on a number of
organization members who saw a rapidly growing organization
no longer capable of achieving its goals as a "one-woman
operation". Or perhaps Williams was no longer perceived as a
symbol of change and development.
In 1975, when a "Boston Brahman" joined the board,
many in the Boston area believed that the company's board
had become "prestigious". Writing about Boston arts boards
in general.- Christine Temin, Boston Globe dance critic,
commenting on Cabot and the Boston Ballet board said,
"In 1983 she gave more than $50,000 to the Ballet, which
was not considered a 'prestige' board until she joined it
5
in 1975." It is unknown if other "Boston Brahmans"
followed her in at that time; nonetheless, the complexion
of the board seemed to change with its slowly increasing
budget. With a wider range of board members, there
followed a wider range of personal agendas.
However, between 1980 and 1982 when the organization
was without a president, board members performed in that
capacity. Some organization members suspected that the
board's reputation for being "meddling" and "powerful"
became entrenched and part of the organization's
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standard operating procedure at that time. In fact, in
1983 when the founder/co-artistic director "stepped aside"
thus allowing Verdy to become artistic director, it was
assumed by many both inside and outside the organization
that this move was brought about through the machinations
of the board.
The major focus of the following comments is how
organization members perceived the role of the board and
the board's role and behavior during the Garrick-Verdy
conflict.
A former board member said, "Now the idea is not
necessarily to have people who are particularly
interested in the dance or understand dance but who want
to lend their name or either their money or who have
friends who have money. The principal function of the
board is to raise money but the original board did
everything, whatever needed to be done." At present,
the board members do not do everything. Others contend
that they do not do anything. The general consensus of
those members of the organization who were interviewed
was that the board had a tendency toward "meddling" into
the affairs of artists, managers, administrators, and
even dancers, often expecting them to perform without
pay at house parties and special events. There is clearly
a conflict within the organization about the appropriate
role of the board.
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The consensus of the staff and management of the
organization is that the major responsibility and function
of the board should be to raise money. Some organizational
members suggested that this was all they should do. An
employee recalled, "I think that there is too much deadwood
on the board. There are people who don't come to meetings,
who do not either donate or fund raise the amount of money
they're committed to, who have been on the board for too
long. I think the new chairman of the board or the
current chairman of the board has to bring on more people
who are active and interested in the future of the
company, not just because it is a social situation to be
in. Most of the ones who are involved just for social
reasons don't give that much money in the first place."
One member of the organization observed that, "They all
have artistic opinions and because they give money they
feel that they have a right", and "if they were qualified,
fine, but they're not. They're qualified in an entirely
different area", and "I wonder sometimes how qualified
they are. They come from many different backgrounds and
in such things as corporate business, business is business,
and there's a right way to sell or market your product no
matter what the product is, but when it comes to artistic
things, that's a whole different ball game. It's like me
being the chief administrator of a hospital and walking
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into the operating room and saying to a neurosurgeon, 'You
shouldn't make a cut there.' Totally foreign to most
people."
In 1983, the board walked into Williams' sphere--the
sphere of the founder/artistic director--a sphere most
likely "totally foreign" to many of the board members and
said to her that it was time for her to "step aside". An
organization member recalled that time, "Well, they wanted
to make it look like her decision for continuity and they
had her convinced it was the right thing for the company
but she was not convinced. She was only doing it because
she saw the writing on the wall. And she thought that if
Violette took it over, it would bring new focus to the
company, new energy, and that's all she really cared
about and after Violette came on, she let it be known to
many people in the organization that she'd made a mistake."
Williams over the years had acquired a reputation of
being a persuasive person, and able to influence people
both within and outside the organization. It is not clear
why she did not attempt to convince or manipulate the board
into allowing Verdy to bring new focus to the company as a
guest instructor-in-residence. An organization member
recalled her ability to influence others: "She had an
effect over a number of people and we never knew how she
did it to us. I saw it happen so many times. It's ironic
because she kind of looked like a bag lady. So it wasn't
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that she had a refinement that made you react, it was
just something about her. She could manipulate people.
Whether it was conscious or unconscious, I don't know,
but it was not a confrontation. You had to chuckle as she
walked away and say, 'She's done it again to me'. So I
think that was a very valuable gift and that's what
probably made her create all this. She was selfless enough
that she didn't care if somebody ended up hating her
because she had to ask nine hundred times for whatever. I
don't think it mattered as long as she got what the
organization needed. It didn't matter that people would
say, 'Oh, here she is again, give her the money and shut
her up.' And I think she would say, 'That's good now, I
got the money. That's what I came for.'" Another
employee recalled her technique, "There was something
about her. You would sell your soul to the devil for her
but not for anyone else. She had a genius for picking out
the right person for the right job. She got all the credit.
You knew that when you took it on, perfectly willing. That
was her strongest point. She somehow could manipulate
people and get them to kill themselves for the good of the
company."
Violette Verdy, a former diva, pressured the board to
make her the sole artistic director. The board complied in
1983, and Williams was assigned the titles of founder and
artistic advisor. The board and the management team had by
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that time, because of the financial losses in 1980 and 1981,
developed a conservative fiscal policy. However, this policy
was in conflict with Verdy's artistic goals. An employee
described it this way, "She had big ideas for the company.
So when she persuaded the board to persuade the founder to
step aside and let her have the title, she wanted much bigger
things than the board felt they could afford and she couldn't
make them understand what she had in mind. You know, men
will not listen to women. They just won't. Her principal
concern was to be on a much higher level technically but
the board wants to make the artistic decisions because
they control the money and wanted to control not only the
money but also the artistic decisions because what you do
artistically depends on how much money you can spend and
Virginia was able to wiggle around. Violette had no
patience for that. She got no place with them during
that period which was only a.few months."
In 1984 the board had become "operational". An
organization member pointed out how this happened. "In
the past two years it has become more operational than it
perhaps should be and I think they would agree with that
and that is because we've had so much turmoil--both
internal and external. It's very attractive for a board
member to be operational, but I think they would agree
that that is not their primary function here. It's great
fun to come in once a month to a meeting and be a problem
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solver and get right in there and muck around", and "We
had a space of time between them (presidents) where there
was a board member who was like an acting president. Maybe
that . . . I don't know. I've heard people say that they
don't raise as much as they should and do meddle more than
they should."
Both the president, Garrick, and the artistic director,
Verdy, were trying to influence and control the board.
During this struggle the organization lost its founder.
Williams died on May 8, 1984. Two "influential" board
members, Sunny Dupree and Maryellen Cabot, followed Verdy
and resigned from the board in September 1984. An
organization member recalled these resignations, "The two
board members who left, Dupree and Cabot, was a function
of . . . they really had no choice in their minds. They
were staunch supporters of Violette. When Violette said,
'You've got to fire Garrick', and they said , 'Yes, we have
to do this because Violette is the future of the company.'
Then when Violette bolted and left everybody holding the bag,
they had to save face," and "Verdy and Cabot and Dupree were
all one swoop. Verdy was best friends with Maryellen Cabot
and Dupree was trying to, through Maryellen Cabot,
manipulate the board, Cabot having been former chairman of
the board, and Sunny Dupree was just Cabot's friend . . .
and when Verdy resigned and quit then Dupree and Cabot
had to because they said that if they didn't fire Joel
86
Garrick and keep Verdy that they would leave the board and
when Verdy resigned, they had to."
In December 1984, the board's response to this
organizational turmoil was to design a "new strategic
plan" that would address some organizational problems. One
of the goals of the strategic plan was to "improve the
quality of on-stage performances and the community's
perception of the company's artistic quality". This
meant placing emphasis on supporting a community-driven
ballet company, an organization member recalled, "There
are four kinds of ballet companies a board might be willing
to support--community-driven, choreographer-driven,
tradition-driven, and dancer-driven. A community-driven
ballet company is interested in providing the art of
dancing and the product that the company produces, ballets
and performances, to a geographically-centered area that is
Boston. That is sensitive to the needs and wants of the
Boston-area community both in the kind of repertoire we
want to provide them with and with other services both
educational and community enrichment that will contribute
to the community in a way that the community would fell
good about it. And we've recently expanded the concept of
community-driven to New England. So its not just Boston.
The idea is to regain our base of support--to regain the
support of the people who really make us here."
Ironically, the past had become the future. Almost
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thirty years earlier when the informal concert group was
incorporated into a civic ballet company, Williams wanted
to establish a regional dance company. An organization
member recalled, "In the beginning, we tried to open it to
all the schools, first to all the local schools and then
all the New England schools but the teachers were afraid
that she was trying to steal their best pupils away so they
were all very suspicious and resentful and that was why she
was going to call it the New England Ballet Company--some
phrase with "New England" in it--hoping to make it a regional
company, an entire New England regional group, but that was
most unsuccessful." Thus, one of the board's "Strategic
Plan Goals for the Fiscal year '86 would be a return to
Williams' original idea. Finally, in January 1985, the
board appointed Bruce Marks as the organization's third
artistic director. Marks assumed his position in June 1985.
Thus, the role of the board and how it carried out
its duties and responsibilities in its effort to fulfill its
obligations evoked a number of comments from organization
members. Often, the motives of various members were
questioned. Even though the board exercised power acquired
through its 1963 corporate bylaws, organization members
expressed concern about the board having too much power. In
terms of managing the organization, there were questions
about whether or not the board was qualified to manage a
performing arts organization. The consensus was that the
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primary function of the board was not to manage the Ballet
but to raise funds and endeavor to ensure the organization's
financial stability.
The board's reason for being assembled in the early
days was to help establish, build, and expand a ballet
company and school. At that time, the goals of the founder
and the goals of the board were, in most instances,
compatible. This early situation created an organizational
environment where conflict over differences were either nil,
did not arise, or if they did, were few, and manageable.
However, as the organization grew and developed, new
people arrived whose primary concern was not the growth of a
ballet company but working in a job that happened to be in
a performing arts organization. Consequently, conditions for
conflict also grew and developed.
Another issue of concern to organization members
was the manner in which the board, as governing body,
carried out its role in situations of organizational
conflict. That is, how well had the board managed or
resolved problems of conflict between and among those
members of the organization they managed? Were they
effective at managing or resolving conflict, or rather,
were they, on occasion, parties to or even sources of
organizational conflict? For example, were they parties to
the Garrick-Verdy conflict? Had their "meddling" in
management and artistic matters provoked that conflict?
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These questions remain unanswered; however, they will be
considered again in Chapter 6, Explanations.
The Artistic/Management Dichotomy
Certainly in staff, the programmatic side of a
nonprofit organization, direct training, experience,
and skill in the field of activity is the primary
criterion by which people should initially be judged
. . . However, on the management side, the issue is not
clear.6
In chapter 8 of The Performing Arts: Problems and
Prospects, it is noted that a "good manager" in a performing
arts organization is many things--"an impresario, a labor
negotiator, a diplomat, an educator, a publicity and public
relations expert, a politician, a skilled businessman, a
social sophisticate, a servant of the community, a tireless
leader--becomingly humble before authority--a teacher, a
7
tyrant, and a continuing student of the arts". Of course,
if these are the criteria by which to measure a "good
manager", then indeed a "good manager" must be really hard to
find. A person functioning in a number of multifarious
roles must surely end up stepping on his own toes and
frequently on the toes of many others in his organization.
In fact, it was reported that, "one ballet world source
says that recently no fewer than 11 US troupes were looking
for managers, with one Sun Belt company desperate enough to
8
offer a six figure salary".
Since 1971 the company has had two presidents, two
general managers, four business managers, and three
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artistic directors. In terms of top management, the
first president, Michael Judson, worked in that capacity
for about eight years, and as one employee recalled, "He
was very young when he got the position and sort of
grew with the company". The second president, Joel Garrick,
was hired after a three-year hiatus and worked in that
capacity for one year and a half. The founder, E. Virginia
Williams, was the artistic director of the company for
more than twenty years and of the school for more than
forty years. The artistic director, Verdy, worked in
that capacity for about fifteen months and as co-artistic
director for three years. The third artistic director,
Bruce Marks, began in June 1985.
Before Williams opened her school in Boston in 1940
she had "taught in six different schools in and around
9
Boston". However, in her own school she not only taught
but worked as artistic director, i.e., ballet mistress
and choreographer and as chief administrator. Throughout
the years she continued and increased working in a number of
different capacities. Her best students grew into an
informal dance troupe, then into a regional ballet company,
and then into a professional ballet company. But in 1960,
two years after her informal dance troupe was incorporated
as the New England Civic Ballet of Boston, she began
relinquishing her duties. First she gave up full-time
choreographing that year because of pressing administrative
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duties and responsibilities. Then in 1971, Williams was
asked to "surrender" her administrative duties when the
board hired a new management team to "control the company's
operations". In 1980, she shared her artistic directorship
until she relinquished that post in 1983. In 1983, and
again, as in the beginning, she was teaching in a school.
The difference was that the school was no longer her school,
for in 1980 she had sold the Boston School of Ballet, her
privately-owned school to the organization, the Boston
Ballet, and the school thus became known as the Boston
Ballet School, Incorporated. Even so, she continued
functioning not as artistic director but as artistic
advisor both to the company and the school that she had
earlier founded.
When other people began to occupy the role(s)
previously occupied by Williams, a change in the
organizational climate and structure followed. A number of
administrative duties previously performed by Williams were
now distributed among four members of the new management
team who were assigned the duties and responsibilities of
persons functioning in the positions of treasurer,
accountant, company manager, and fund-raiser. However, the
differences that ensued, especially between artistic and
management staffs and their directors, accelerated in 1980
with the arrival of the company's second artistic director,
Verdy, gained momentum in 1982 with the arrival of the
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company's second president, Garrick, and escalated into
open warfare in 1984 with the death of the organization's
founder, E. Virginia Williams.
The following are comments by organization members that
focus on events related to and about the conflict between
the artistic director and the president.
There had been growing for years and years and years a
sense of division between the artistic and management,
a sense that it was the artistic against management
. . . management against artistic, depending on what
side of the alley you happened to be on. (A member
of the management team of the Ballet)
The foundation for this conflict was established in 1971
when the board hired a management team that was responsible
to the board and removed the administrative duties and
responsibilities of E. Virginia Williams. However, since the
first president was "very young" and "sort of grew with the
company", the implication is that despite the arrival of the
new management team, Williams, perhaps due to her position
and personality, was able to influence the organization's
"young president". Also, it was assumed he would voluntarily
consent to her wishes or demands. Following her death, an
organization member recalled, "She was the mainstay. She was
the mother figure, the father figure--the one we all looked
to. Everybody thought she would be here forever but that
wasn't to be. We all looked to her. She was very strong".
Thus, the success and reputation of the Boston Ballet
continued to grow even though the foundation for the
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artistic/management conflict had been set. The board of
trustees pressured Williams to bring in an associate
director. Their overriding concern was to find someone who
was not too old and someone with a big name. They were
interested in a big name because they thought the public
was also interested in a big name. Thus, they thought the
publicity that would follow a big name would indirectly
attract more people and money to the ballet. One member of
the organization commented, "I don't know if a big name is
vital. They cast about for a long time and She (Williams)
didn't want to do it. She was never the kind that could work
with anyone. She wanted to make all the decisions, all the
rules."
Violette Verdy was hired as co-artistic director in
1980. She had earned an international reputation as a
prima ballerina with the New York City Ballet and had
worked as the director of the government-supported Paris
Opera Ballet. Verdy was also nineteen years younger than
Williams. She also wanted to add more of the "lavish"
nineteenth century story ballets to the repertoire and to
emphasize touring accompanied by well-known guest artists.
Verdy was able to persuade the board to make her sole
artistic director in 1983.
Joel Garrick was appointed president of the Boston
Ballet in 1982. He was the chief administrator of both
the school and the company and was thus responsible for
94
carrying out the goals set forth by the board of trustees
in the official documents of the organization. It was also
expected that Garrick would increase the organization's
revenues and increase its artistic reputation by devising
and implementing a plan that would allow the organization to
serve not only its primary Boston audience but also its
secondary regional audience.
When Verdy was able to persuade the board to make her
artistic director, she and Garrick naturally came into
conflict, first of all, because the artistic/management
battle lines had been drawn before either parties had
arrived on the scene, and second, because Garrick appointed
president at the same time Verdy was artistic director
aggravated the conditions for conflict. As one organization
member recalled, "They both had volatile personalities.
Personally, they didn't get along very well." They both
expected that his or her job was to shape the future
direction of the organization. One member of the
organization noted that Verdy's contract, "gave her
unlimited powers within the organization and approval over
many areas of administration that made it difficult to get
the work done. It required so many approval steps that got
in the way of what was clearly a president's responsibility
--making sure that projects happen. The contract suggested
that she wanted control over things that should have been
the purview of the president yet she wasn't capable of that.
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She didn't have the experience nor did she have the ability
to handle everything. And on the other side of it, the
president did muck around in things that were clearly none
of his business, none of his responsibility, under any sort
of a description of what a president should be doing."
The only thing that prevented this natural conflict from
growing into a declared and open war was the mediation of
Williams. She acted as a "buffer" between the president
and the artistic director. An organization member recalled,
"Joel was having lots of problems with Violette. He really
couldn't get anything done and couldn't tell what she
wanted and they weren't talking to each other. It was just
a mess, and on the other hand Violette was essentially
incapable of communicating clearly or in a way that people
could understand. I would say most people in the
organization stopped trying to figure out what it was and
and just sort of went with whatever way it went that day,"
and "She (Williams) was a buffer that provided a mediator
kind of viewpoint". Williams' primary concern was getting
the parties to reach a truce before a situation developed
that would jeopardize the organization's image. Again, her
major concern was "the good of the company".
A member of the company recalled this activity: "She
was so effective that she kept her mouth shut, she wouldn't
mention it. She would see a problem happening and would let
it get to the point where it was just about to bust and then
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she would go in there and make everything all right. it
took the bite out of the punch, but it kept people working
together where they would have fumed, split, and we
would have faced the ultimate break that we did ultimately
face."
When E. Virginia Williams died on May 8, 1984, the
conflict between Verdy and Garrick broke into "open war".
In talking about the organizational climate before Williams'
death, an organization member recalled, "I think it was
pretty wartorn before her death. She was the person with
the white flag going from trench to trench. When the person
with the white flag went away there was no one to say, 'Stop
shooting'". And "There were power struggles even before her
death that really came to a head when she died. The president
wanted to make artistic decisions and was not qualified to
do so . . . The artistic director wasn't a decision-making
type of person, didn't like dealing with boards, didn't deal
well on that level, didn't realize that just didn't work."
Nonetheless, when Verdy presented the board with a "him" or
"me" choice, the board perceiving Verdy as the "greater
talent" asked Garrick to resign. Commenting succinctly on
why Garrick rather than Verdy was forced to resign, an
organization member recalled, "They felt that Violette was
the greater talent," and "Actually, the reality of it was
Violette forced his resignation by essentially saying its
him or me and at that point there was no one on the board
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willing to throw Violette out in order to keep Garrick.
Then three weeks later she said that not only was Garrick
the problem but also the board chairman. She said, 'I
want him to resign'. It was at that point that several
members of the board started standing up and saying, 'Now
just a minute'. That was when she resigned." Another
organization member recalled, "So Joel was fired and
Violette actually wanted four other people fired in the
organization at that time. She said she could not have
control of the company until we were all gone." The four
other people were the board chairman, the general manager,
a resident choreographer, and the marketing director. Thus
when the board refused her requests, Verdy resigned effective
June 24, 1984. Another organization member recalled that,
"Violette wanted everyone who ever said 'No' to her on a
monetary matter out of the organization. She said they
didn't understand her artistically and that she couldn't
function."
This section has attempted a consideration of the
division and differences that developed between persons
engaged in management and in artistic activities at the
Ballet--differences that surfaced and erupted into open
conflict following the death of Williams between the
president, Garrick, and the artistic director, Verdy.
The management/artistic struggle appeared inevitable in that
it grew out of a situation where one person as founder
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and leader, Williams, had functioned in several positions,
including artistic director and manager, for a number of
years without an apparent need to define her tasks or write
them up in job description form, for as long as she was
around, she could tell organization members what to do and
how to do it. However, as the organization grew and
developed, persons hired to perform in the areas where
Williams and others had previously performed (and where
Williams frequently continued to function) found themselves
in situations where it was never quite clear to them exactly
where and what they should be doing and for whom.
Ironically, specialists hired to improve the organization's
efficiency often found themselves in situations where they
were not allowed to do so without interference.
The Verdy-Garrick conflict under those circumstances
was inevitable. These two individuals, both new to the
organization and both hired to improve the organization's
image and efficiency, clashed because there were no clearcut
guidelines suggesting to them where they were to perform
their tasks, the bounds within which they were to perform,
what tasks they were to perform, and where in the
organization their differences could be discussed, managed,
or resolved rather than buffered or suppressed as their
conflict was in its early stages. Neither Garrick nor
Verdy had organizational guidelines to support their
activities. At that juncture, it would have been innovative
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of the board to have established some sort of guidelines,
perhaps even in the form of job descriptions. This
strategy may have been viewed by organization members as a
step towards alleviating the Verdy-Garrick conflict and
some of the conditions for that conflict, rather than being
viewed as a measure to institutionalize a performing arts
organization or as a strategy of control. However,
following the resignations of Garrick and Verdy, a step taken
by the board in alleviating future conflict between
organization members engaged in artistic and management
activities involved eliminating the position of president.
Financial Instability
The Boston Ballet received $144,000 for three years in
1963 from the Ford Foundation. In 1966 the Ford Foundation
provided the Boston Ballet with a grant of $300,000. This
money gave the ballet the working capital to produce ballets
that would generate revenue. In 1970 the Boston Ballet
received $350,000 from the Ford Foundation. These funds
were the result of E. Virginia Williams' contact with the
Ford Foundation through George Balanchine and W. McNeil
Lowry. Although a financial crisis in 1971 caused Williams
to be stripped of administrative duties in the Boston Ballet,
she was able to obtain a four-year $470,460 matching grant
from the Ford Foundation; the purpose of the grant was to
stabilize the organization financially. A member of the
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organization recalled, ". . . 1973-74 were real rough times.
There were rumors of not being able to meet the payroll and
people had to go out and ask trustees to make their donations
so that they could make the payroll. I was never asked to go
without a paycheck but I'm sure it was close to that." In
1975 the Ford grant ended and the Boston Ballet, in order
to increase ticket sales, became more conservative in its
repertoire. In 1979, the ballet initiated a series of
national and international tours, expensive, and not always
financially successful. In 1980, the Boston Ballet Company
bought the Boston School of Ballet from Williams,
incorporated the school as a nonprofit affiliate of the
company, the Boston Ballet School, and in 1982 and 1983 used
resources from the school to meet company expenses.
In 1984 the company nearly went bankrupt again. A
staff member commented, "In 1984 we were at the edge of our
credit. We essentially just squeaked by. We were at the
point where we were seriously considering whether we were
going to meet the payroll and then we came out of it," and
"We're on much more stable footing now, but there had to be
a lot of belt tightening." Capacity attendance at the 1984
traditional holiday performance of The Nutcracker and a
major second settlement on the insurance claim from damages
suffered as a result of injury to a guest artist helped
stabilize the organization financially. One person said,
"The combination of those two put us in a better position
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but certainly not out of the woods and not to a place where
we should abandon recapitalizing."
The financial situation of 1984 was a result of two
events and deviation from an organizational plan. As one
organization member recalled, "In October 1984 the company
was near bankrupt. We lost a reasonable amount . . .
primarily caused by two events that we had no control over
and a deviation from a plan that wasn't really thought
through and deviation from the plan was the decision to
essentially change our season in Boston and go on tour with
a guest artist and take the glamorous route as opposed to the
route that was consistent with the plan. And almost at the
same time the first force majeure situation. The Wang
Center had to close for an unsafe roof. We had to move our
Nutcracker to Hynes Auditorium. We were unable to perform
eight or nine of the performances we had scheduled, so we
had not the opportunity to make the income we had budgeted
and that resulted in a half-million dollar shortfall
relative to budget. It was the opportunistic approach and
long-term trade-off. We would do a tour in Europe that would
lose money, at the end of which we would do a production in
Boston whereby we would make it all back, and some, to put
the company in a better net position. We did all the part of
the tour that lost money and we got here to Boston and due
to an injury the guest artist had to cancel after the first
night. He cancelled eleven of the twelve performances and
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that was another $500,000 net loss. We were insured for it,
but that was just in October of last year we received the
second portion of the settlement on that claim," and "You
set a plan in motion and if you don't get the revenue at
the end of it, you've already paid out most of it. So we
continued to get ourselves in a worse net position and that
meant going to the banks, setting up a line of credit and
going into debt with the banks. That's why I was saying
1984." The problem of financial instability persisted
throughout the organization's history, as was the case in
many nonprofit performing arts organizations that were
frequently unable to manage their deficits or to ensure
their organization's fiscal health.
The fact of financial instability was not explicitly
expressed in my interviews as a subject of conflict.
Nevertheless, methods for alleviating the problem were often
viewed in terms of duties and responsibilities of board
members who were sometimes seen as failing to fulfill their
fund-raising obligations. Organization members agreed
that the primary function of the board should be to raise
funds, "to provide adequate direct financial contributions
10
and commitment to fund-raising". The view that the board
should be ensuring the organization's financial stability
seemed based on interview comments, less a subject for
discussion of organizational conflict than discussion of the
fact that the board was not fulfilling its primary task of
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raising funds. Perhaps these phenomena were perceived as
being intertwined. In that case, it is assumed that
respondents did not see where it was necessary to discuss
the board's fund-raising role in relation to the board's
role of bringing financial stability to the organization.
In discussing the duties and responsibilities of board
members in nonprofit organizations, especially their
fund-raising duties, Wolf suggests that, "trustees must
support the organization in spirit, encouraging others to
be as enthusiastic about its programs and activities as
they are; and they must support the organization more
tangibly with money, demonstrating that those closest to the
organization, its trustees, are 100 percent committed to
11
it." With emphasis, Wolf continued, "put quite simply,
everyone who serves on a board of trustees must contribute
some cash every year to their organization," and "how much
they contribute is another matter, but there should be no
ambiguity about the requirement of some sort of annual cash
12
gift." Trustees were expected to contribute $5000 a year,
but an employee recalled that exceptions were made. Based on
comments from organization members, the Boston Ballet did
not have any exceptionally generous patrons.
Thus, in the case of the Boston Ballet, as with most
nonprofit performing arts organizations, the board had to
contribute and raise funds. But in order to successfully
raise funds, an organization's "financial house" had to be
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in order. Again Wolf pointed out that for an organization
to raise "significant funds," it must take the following
steps to "dress itself up properly":
1. It must put its fiscal affairs in order.
2. It must develop a convincing case for support that
relates to the contributor's own funding agenda.
3. It must demonstrate a strong commitment and
involvement of its board of directors in all phases
of the fund-raising effort.13
In terms of the board and the organization's history
of financial instability, again, a major concern of some
organization members was whether or not the board was, in
fact, dedicated enough to ensuring, or at least attempting
to ensure, "fiscal health" for the organization. Concerns
of some of organization members thus evolved around the
following subjects that both affected the organization's
future and the means chosen by the board members to provide
a financially stable organizational environment:
Extensive National and International Touring. In 1983
the company toured for six weeks in Europe visiting Belgium,
Italy, and England. They danced in Swan Lake and Don
Quixote, two full-length story ballets. Nureyev was the
famous guest artist accompanying them. According to a
Boston Globe report, "the advantage of the company's
summertime tours according to company president, Joel
Garrick, is extra weeks of employment for the dancers, which
benefits them both financially and in honing their skills
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before audiences. As for the company finances, the tour
14
was essentially a break even function." This same
article also reported that, "Garrick noted it was still,
in terms of attracting producers and audiences, essential
15
for the Boston Ballet to tour with a guest artist."
In 1980 the Boston Ballet toured the People's
Republic of China. A DanceMagazine article reported that,
"Although the burden of expenses has not been determined
yet, the company expects to pay a substantial portion of the
costs. It will attempt to raise $250,000 from corporate
16
sponsors."
In the August 1984 issue of DanceMagazine, it was
reported that the Boston Ballet failed to maintain its
identity at home while touring from 1979-82 to the
People's Republic of China, the Far East, Europe, and
throughout the United States. This same article noted that,
"some major patrons are eager for the Boston Ballet to
return to China for a second tour, and in general, to
travel more often. Many others hope that the company will
sink its roots deeper into its home territory and grow
17
healthier before it continues it globe trotting."
The Ballet's new and third artistic director, Bruce
Marks, according to DanceMagazine, "says he already has
plans for change. Under Verdy's leadership, the ensemble
toured extensively in the unglorious capacity of back-up
company, mostly with Rudolph Nureyev--a direction to which
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Marks is adamantly opposed."
Famous Guest Artists. In The Performing Arts and
American Society, Gelles, in chapter 8, "The Ballet",
an account of the Pennsylvania Ballet and its director,
Babara Weisberger, quoted Weisberger on guest artists:
"Don't think you are going to snare the public and then do
all the things you really wanted to do. It doesn't happen
that way. Your audience feels cheated mentally after that
or they get mentally set to expect guests all the time.
And what have done? You've defeated your most important
purpose, which is to perpetuate, to continue. You've also
hurt the morale of the dancers, who, except in very specific
instances, don't want to work all year and then have the
goodies given away . . . anyway, it is a myth that you sell
a million tickets because you have a guest artist. First
of all, it is stupid to bring in somebody whose talent is
way up there while the rest of your company is way down
here. Get your dancers built up to the level where they
are so good that they are going to be asked to be guest
19
artist."
The Audience. A public opinion survey conducted in
January 1973 revealed that, "The American public . . . has
had more limited exposure to ballet and modern dance than to
20
any other art with the exception of opera." In response
to the question, "If you were going to a dance performance,
21
which type of dancing would you most like to see?",
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fourteen percent chose classical ballet, twenty-four percent
chose folk and ethnic dance, twenty-two percent chose modern
dance, eleven percent chose ballroom dancing, and four
22
percent chose tap dancing.
The National Endowment for the Arts in its 1984
annual report noted that, "Dance . . . in 1965 had an
audience of approximately one million (80 percent based
in New York City), now claims attendance of 16 million in
23
most parts of the country." In contrast, NEA also
reported that, "61 percent of the adult population in 1982
did not attend a single jazz, classical music, opera,
musical/operetta, theatrical, or ballet performance, or
24
visit an art museum or gallery." Data on attendance at
just ballet performances are in the process of being
compiled at NEA.
In terms of audience preferences, it is unknown if an
audience survey was ever conducted in the Boston and New
England region to determine audience preference for the
kinds of ballets it would like to see performed and also to
determine audience constituencies. In discussing the small
ballet audience in Boston, one organization member recalled,
"there is a limited audience for ballet and we tried to
experiment with some modern pieces some years back and they
were soundly rejected. They only wanted Swan Lake and The
Sleeping Beauty. So a great deal of progress has been made
in that area. People are much more receptive to new work.
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The younger portion of our audience like to see experimental
things. They receive them better. Their minds are more
open, not having a preconceived idea of what classical
ballet is, you know, tutus and pointe shoes. It can be a
lot more than that."
Ballet company repertoires usually include the classical
19th and 20th century ballets, ballets created by
contemporary choreographers, ballets created especially for
a particular company, and the large-scale full-length story
ballets. The Boston Ballet has in it repertoire works in
all four groups, along with works in the modern dance idiom.
Its contemporary classics are mostly works by Balanchine and
it leans towards the traditional ballets. Somewhere around
1979 how and why a board decision was made to stage the
expensive full-length story ballets despite the
organization's shaky financial situation remained unknown;
however, it is safe to assume the big ballets came with
Verdy. Commenting on the costs of producing repertoire
works, an organization member said, "The cost of producing,
it's funny. It's like the balloon, the air expands to
fill the available space. You can spend as much as you
want on a particular production--depending on what you're
counting--dancers' salaries, administrative salaries,
overhead for the company . . . I think we would all be
shocked and amazed at how much a ballet really costs us."
Lewis, in discussing the full-length story ballet,
109
Swan Lake, said in 1981, "It costs about a quarter of a
million dollars to produce a ballet of that size and
25
elaborateness."
Subscription Lists Contributions, and Ticket Sales
are all affected by the end of the ballet boom. This
change will adversely affect the organization's survival
unless innovative measures are designed and implemented
to counteract financial problems brought about by this
change. Despite an increase in subscriptions at the
Boston Ballet from 5800 in 1982 to 10,000 in 1984, an
80 percent increase; in contributed income from $600,000
to $1.2 million during the same period, a 100 percent
increase, and the fact that ticket sales were
essentially 90 percent of all earned income, funds
needed to be raised.
Corporate Support. The corporate world of Boston
does not ordinarily support the art world of ballet.
Corporate support is low. Still, the company recently
received a $125,000 grant from the Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner and Smith stock brokerage firm. Even so, corporate
support in Boston accounts for 1.8 percent of the
combined operating budgets of arts groups as compared to
4 percent in San Francisco, 10 percent in Houston, and
14.6 percent in Minneapolis.
Public Support. The Boston Ballet has a $4.9 million
annual budget and although it receives support from the
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National Endowment for the Arts to promote artistic
development, financial stability, and performance
activities; the Massachusetts Council on the Arts and
Humanities to provide basic support, and expects to
receive support from the Greater Boston Arts Fund to
expand and strengthen its financial resources, these
funds will not be enough, even if combined, for the
organization to carry out all of its activities.
The National Arts Stabilization Fund is a fund
created and supported by the Ford, Rockefeller, and
Mellon Foundations to expand and strengthen the
financial resources of performing and other arts
organizations. Boston was selected as its "pilot city"
and will be provided with $3 million over several years
to be matched by $3 million from the Greater Boston Arts
Fund, a public/private effort that is a branch of the
National Arts Stabilization Fund. The Greater Boston
Arts Fund is made up of thirty corporations, the
Massachusetts Council on the Arts and Humanities, and
the Permanent Charities Fund. Middle-sized performing
arts organizations like the Boston Ballet were in the
first batch of organizations to receive funds. The huge
groups--the symphony, the museum, and the opera were in
a later batch.
Finally, in view of the organization's limited
resources, how board members and those in top management
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responded to the high costs of a program of extensive
national and international touring, the contracting of
famous guest artists, the small ballet audience, the
lack of corporate support, and the changeable nature of
public and non-corporate private support would, because
of their importance, ultimately have an impact on the
organization's financial situation. The status of the
organization's financial health was, in large part,
determined by the organization's policy and budgetary
decisions. If these decisions proved impractical for
whatever reasons then, the board and others in top
management positions would again have created conditions
for the existence of organizational conflict.
Teac hing~ Styles in the School
E. Virginia Williams began teaching in the 1930s when
she was sixteen years old. For more than half-a-century
she taught ballet and during that time developed her own
teaching and dance "style." She produced a number of
professional dancers recognized for their technique and
style--"dancing's concerns." By 1960 many of her former
pupils were working in the Ballet Russe de Monte Carlo,
Robert Joffrey's American Ballet Center Company, the
San Francisco Ballet, the New York City Ballet, the
Metropolitan Opera Ballet, Radio City Music Hall with
the Rockettes, and in companies in Europe and Canada.
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In 1976 Tobias wrote,
The company has a marked cohesiveness of style.
The dancers move with delicacy and care--a
physical sensitivity and a fine sense of
placement and awareness of line. Their
performances are honest, understated--in fact
they might do with a bit more boldness in space,
and panache--happily, with no theatrical or
stylistic excesses. They reflect their founder's
manner.26
Williams' style resulted from her unique teaching style, a
method of instruction that combined the classic steps,
movements, and positions and the techniques of the
romantic ballet. Commenting again, Tobias said that the
hallmark of her teaching and of her company was her sense
27
of structure, taste and style.
However, by 1983, neither company dancers nor school
pupils were being described as having any particular style
or possessing a cohesive and unique style of dancing. A
1982-83 internal task force report recommended the need
for students in the school "to grow in the 'style' of the
Boston Ballet so that they will be ready to join the
company." Nonetheless, a description of that style was
not outlined in the report nor defined in terms that
would clarify what the organization aspired to in terms
of its own dancing style. In 1983, in discussing the
status of the company, a reporter said, ". . . it could
become something dazzling. I mean, if it finally
realized that what it needs more than anything is an
identity. One built on a repertoire that was unmistakably
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its own. A mixture of new choreography and classic works
that signaled a personality and a mind behind the whole
28
thing."
In sum, Williams' style became less pronounced in
the school after she began devoting more of her time to
building the company. Consequently, students emulated
the styles of a number of different teachers and thus a
variety of styles emerged rather than one style or
"one single point of view." And since many of the
company dancers were not trained in the school, they
could also be described as having a multitude of styles,
or more specifically no particular style.
So, the dance style in the school and the school
itself are the major topics of the following comments.
The first priority of the Boston School of Ballet
was to survive. Officially incorporated as "The Boston
Ballet School" in 1980, its second priority was to turn
out as many good dancers as possible. The only
difference then and now was that in the beginning the
school didn't have a company to feed dancers into and
they were thus fed into other companies. However, now
the organization would like to keep them for its own
company if they are available. One member of the
organization recalled, "I would say the original idea
still stands--a really good solid dancing school that
gives good training. So what we want to do is to be the
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be all and end all of perfection technically, to train
them right, and to constantly maintain our high
standards." And because the school is the only
professional ballet school associated with a
professional company in the region, this feature allowed
students in preprofessional and open classes to observe
professional dancers and use these dancers as their
models to aid them in determining how far they had to
improve in order to reach a level of professionalism
necessary to become a member of the company.
Williams earned her reputation not only as the
founder of a ballet school and company but also as
teacher of preprofessional, professional, and
nonprofessional dancers. The number of professional
dancers she trained has been well-documented.
Nonetheless as the company grew and demanded more of her
time in administrative matters, she spent less time
teaching in the school and did not have the trained
personnel nor the time to maintain the quality of
teaching at the level she had brought the school. At
the time of her death, the amount of time she had spent
in the school was very limited. Members of the
organization recalled, "Before her death Williams had a
limited schedule of teaching because she was pulled in
many directions. She was terribly preoccupied for some
115
years. So her schedule was unpredictable because she
was filling in for an instructor in one of her suburban
schools who was very ill--even when she was ailing
herself," and "In the past year she couldn't make it in
and it was very difficult getting her to make
instantaneous decisions. But at the same time, an
authority figure was missing in the school." As a result,
the situation was frustrating both for Williams and others
because not only were decisions not being made but also
the styles and techniques of different instructors were
not being monitored. Thus the goal of producing and
moving dancers into the company was on hold.
Some teachers in the school failed to continue
training students in the Williams' style and manner that
earlier had produced dancers who were recruited into the
major ballet companies in the United States, Canada, and
Europe. Many of these dancers also found employment in
the theater, in television, in films, and in teaching.
Something had occurred to change the training and
teaching techniques used by Williams, for without her
constant presence and guidance and strength to ensure
that her "uncompromising" high standards were being
maintained, adhered to, and in turn imparted to her
students, her style apparently became less cohesive,
less distinct, and gradually a number of lesser styles
were reflected in the students' styles and levels of
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ability. That is, the same "language" was no longer being
taught. The result of this at first seemingly imperceptible
process over the years became a major source of conflict
as her presence and guidance were felt less and less in
the organization. That is, the conflict over teaching
styles. Commenting on the quality of teaching, an
organization member recalled, "It is an important quality
in the dance world that you retain your history . . . to
keep the similar focus so that we're talking the same
language. We're not always teaching the same language."
Commenting on this conflict, an organization member
said, "I think we have some very good teachers in the
school and I think we also have some terrible teachers.
Unfortunately, the division seems to come in the levels of
the school. In the beginning levels, I think our teaching
staff leaves a lot to be desired. I think there is much
that needs to changed, altered, or replaced. It's an
important area. The good teachers want to teach the
advanced students and be able to do wonderful combinations,
partnering, and variations. Unfortunately, what I keep
seeing is that when you get people that really have
something to give, they want to work with the company,"
and "Right now, the growth and the development of the
school is not the same as the company as it should be.
Most people in the Boston Ballet have not been trained at
the Boston Ballet. That is not right. Forty years and
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we're not making it."
On the other hand, a member of the school noted that,
"In five years, you're going to see development--a more
cohesive style. A group of exercises designating how much
a student should learn within a year. I would say in five
years you're going to see a stronger syllabus. Also, a
stronger advanced performing group is being molded and
becoming more of a second company. That group is going to
be stronger. Hence, the people coming out of that group are
going to be prepared for the Boston Ballet Company--to be
professional union members paid a salary. And they're going
to be ready."
When the school becomes "one voice" the school will
then automatically be "stylistically oriented". To
facilitate the development of a cohesive style and
technique, teachers of course will be required to work
closely together and under the guidance of the artistic
director or one of his or her assistants. Teachers and
students alike must be evaluated to determine if the style
advocated by the school through the artistic staff is being
conveyed to the students.
Thus, in order to transmit a "cohesiveness of style",
faculty members would first have to agree to the proposed
style, teach that style, and perchance a faculty member
did not agree with the proposed style then that person
could either accommodate, or conform, or if the style was
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totally unacceptable to both the present and prospective
faculty members then clearly they would, respectively,
leave or not be hired in the first place. In other words,
prospective faculty members would not be hired if they were
unwilling to agree to teach the school's adopted style,
could not, or were unwilling to learn how to teach that
style. Some of the teachers would find it extremely
difficult, and others, even impossible to adapt, change
their style and the style they taught, or accommodate. As
one individual in the organization pointed out, "It is the
faculty. We need to shake up the faculty. We have some
people who have been here too long and won't change and
won't accept direction from anyone. Others are not just the
caliber of teachers that should be here at the school, and
some just really don't have the know-how to improve. So
we're understaffed in many ways. We need stronger, more
cohesive faculty working towards the same goals."
Regarding the task of ensuring a "cohesiveness of style" in
the school, another member of the organization recalled,
"Most of the time we do agree on doing things the same. We
try to have a teachers' meeting with the director, artistic
advisor, and our director to discuss how we are teaching, the
way we teach a step or an exercise and most of the time we
do agree on doing things the same. We follow the . . .
basically, we all follow the same patterns. If we're told
to change something, we go ahead and do it, but I show the
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dancers the way I was taught and the way we do it. If it
works, it's fine. If it works for the dancers, then I leave
it alone. If it doesn't, then I'll say, try it this way, and
I'll say to the dancer, "Now remember, I told you two ways--
if one works for you, keep it."
Williams successfully imparted a style and technique
to a number of her students; however, she was not successful
in imparting to some of her instructors her ballet style,
teaching skills, teaching methods, or her attitudes towards
her students that taken together were important constituent
parts that went into producing a number of successful
dancers. At the Boston School of Ballet, Williams was the
dominant voice. An organization member recalled, "It was
her opinion only. But unfortunately what happened is that
she never created an environment in which she shared. She
educated those teachers to her opinion. The problem was
they were in the dark. They were left in the dark to try
and somehow read her mind and second guess what she was
doing." So, Williams' style and techniques of dancing
and methods and style of teaching were difficult for her
to pass along to others or for others to easily grasp.
It should be noted here that Williams patterned her
style of dance after the style of the New York City Ballet.
As an organization member recalled, "Yes, she patterned a
great deal of the work after the New York City Ballet, the
technical aspect of it, but only to a degree. For instance,
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we never felt their arms were right. Their footwork and
some of the training of the body and the feet and legs and
certainly the long skinny legs and short-waisted body that
they featured she liked. But the arms and some of the ballets
we did were more of the European style. So it was a
conglomerate of the old-fashioned European style . . . and
the Balanchine (American style) style which is stark, high,
straight, long skinny legs . . . long thin arms and a high
arched back and a rather strong sparse line as opposed to a
little more fluid embellished interpretation."
Even before Verdy arrived, the school's goal was to
produce the best dancers it could. As one organization
member recalled, "The school's priority has always been to
turn out as many good dancers as we possibly could. The
only difference was that in the beginning we didn't have a
company to feed them into and we fed them into other
people's companies and now we do and we would like to keep
them for our own company if they're suitable, but I would
say the original idea still stands--a really good solid
dancing school that gives good training." However, when
Verdy arrived on the scene as the organization's second
artistic director, she brought some of her ideas with her.
One was to "dramatically upgrade" the school. She also
expressed a profound interest in modeling the school after
the "great ballet academies" of Europe. Oddly enough, in a
city infamous for its stinginess in supporting the arts,
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especially the ballet, which was viewed by many in the area
as either too erotic or too esoteric, it was an ambitious
idea. Nonetheless, she envisioned a school where ballet and
academic courses were combined and where related subjects
such as music, theory of music, the history of dance, other
dance forms, and crafts such as scenery, properties, and
lighting were taught. One individual recalled, "When she
came the focus in the school changed. She made people think
more about the need to have a school that viably produced
dancers for the company. A couple of years ago, there were
teachers in the school and there were ballet masters and
people in the company. Now both teach in the school very
regularly, not only in the summer but also throughout the
year when they have a chance. Company guest teachers also
teach in the school. That gives the students the
opportunity to study with many more people." Commenting
on Verdy and the school, an organization member recalled,
"Verdy never spent enough time in the school to know the
teachers. She never worked in the school." Nonetheless,
both the renewed emphasis on producing more dancers in the
school that in turn could be fed into the company and the
sharing of company and guest teachers were viewed by many in
the organization as steps towards fostering an environment
where a positive exchange could occur between the company and
school people whereby a cohesive Boston Ballet style could
perhaps develop and grow.
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Thus, an organizational environment where one dance
style could develop and grow was a major concern of many in
the organization. Also, many outside the organization often
expressed, albeit not always in the kindest way, their views
on the company's lack of style, often claiming that the
dancers lacked an identity and their unique style of dancing.
Since Williams stopped teaching full-time at the Ballet,
a number of diverse dance styles surfaced and were taught in
the school, and dancers recruited into the company often
arrived with their own distinct styles of dancing. Under
these circumstances, it was difficult for the school and
company dancers to present a uniform and distinct style of
dance. The problem of how to develop and teach a unique
style was often a sensitive issue and an even more difficult
policy to implement mainly because it was unclear whether
the organization had yet discovered the style it really
wanted to project and present to the public. Also, once a
particular style became an established part of the
organization's look, then those instructors unable to
advance that style in the school and the company would
most likely be asked to leave.
Although most of the instructors were aware of the need
to have "one voice" many still would go off in their own
direction, teaching their own brand of ballet in apparent
disregard of the desirability of presenting one dance style
to the public which would enhance the image of both the
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school and the company. Failure to coordinate efforts in
this endeavor was, again, a major source of frustration for
many in the organization who wanted to see the Ballet with
its own unique style. This question of style hovered in
limbo. Perhaps the new artistic director, Marks, will
prove instrumental in taking the problem out of limbo and
in giving the Boston Ballet "one voice".
The Lack of Studio Space
The lack of studio space has been an ongoing problem
since E. Virginia Williams first rented a hall somewhere in
the vicinity of Huntington Avenue and Opera Place in the
Back Bay Section of Boston for one day a week and taught the
remainder of the time in her other suburban studios. When
Maria Paporello, former prima ballerina and ballet mistress
at the Boston Opera Company retired from teaching and moved
from her dance studios at the corner of Huntington Avenue
and Opera Place across from the New England Conservatory
of Music in the Gainsborough Building, Williams moved into
her studios on the top floor and taught classes there for
about three years. The building was torn down in 1958 so
that Northeastern University could build dormitories on the
land. Williams then moved to second-floor studios on
Massachusetts Avenue across the street from what is now
called the Christian Science Center and conducted classes
there for ten years until that building was razed for the
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Church Park Apartments. The exact dates Williams moved
in and out of these buildings are unknown at this time;
however, the point here is that studio facilities were
constantly being sought. From Massachusetts Avenue the
school and company moved to the corner of Washington
Street near Avery Street in the downtown section of
Boston near the fringe of what is now called an "adult
entertainment area" but in fact is Boston's own Combat
Zone. The organization stayed there for about three-four
years until once again the building had to come down for
a parking lot. As they were leaving that building the
stairways were being sealed. The studios they were
leaving were fourth-floor studios. In 1970 Williams moved
into offices and studios on the second and fourth floors
of the Boston Center for the Arts on Tremont Street in the
South End Section of Boston and used studios in that
facility for about two years. Later the organization
acquired more office and studio space in an adjacent
building around the corner on Clarendon Street with
studios for both classes and rehearsals on the first and
second floors. All in all, there are four studios, three
on the first and one on the second floors. There are no
studios set aside solely for rehearsal space. On occasion,
the second and fourth floors of the Tremont Street building
are still used for younger students enrolled in the
Children's Summer Workshop. Administrative offices for
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the company are located in the Tremont Street building and
the school administrative offices are in the Clarendon
Street Building.
Beginning in 1940 when Williams first opened studios
in Boston, the organization had been on the move. At one
period, they moved into a different facility at least once
per decade, but never into a brand-new facility. "Its
headquarters in the South End is drafty, grimy, too small,
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with its offices and studios unconnected," reported the
Boston Globe in April 1984. For some time now there had
been plans to begin a capital campaign to either renovate
the present facilities or to think in terms of building a
new facility. In 1984 one of the organization's strategic
goals for fiscal year 1986 was to "develop a fund-raising
campaign for a new facility for the Boston Ballet."
Beginning in the early days when Williams turned the
first floor of her Malden home into dance studios, the
search for adequate studio space plagued her and of course
plagued others in the organization both before and after
her death. The search began in 1940 for the Boston
organization when Williams moved to her first studio.
Since that time the organization has moved six times. The
sixth and latest move was to a building where for the
first time in the history of the organization first-floor
studios and offices were available. Four of the six
facilities were razed as a result of urban renewal.
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Another, now the proverbial urban parking lot, was located
on the fringe of a so-called combat zone (read red-light
district). However, in contrast, the last two facilities,
both used, were allowed to remain since they were located
in areas still seized in one of the nebulous stages of
transitional regentrification. Nonetheless, despite the
urban renewal business of razing, renovating, and
rebuilding that hovered about and shadowed the Boston
Ballet, it remained a mystery why, until recently, top
management never gave top priority to organizing a
mechanism whereby fund-raising efforts were directed
towards building a new facility to house the organization.
Thus, one of the major problems facing the Boston
Ballet was a shortage of space for both company and school
activities. The professional company after 3:00 P.M. had
to relinquish "enormous amounts of studio space" so that
the students in both open and professional student classes
could take classes. As a result professional dancers had
to return in the evening between 7:00-10:00 P.M. after
open classes to continue their work. Additional space
would allow the school to add more classes, to invite more
guest teachers, and to create conditions favorable for
more turnover in the school. Thus, if studio space were
not taken up by the company dancers during the day more
school classes could then be scheduled. A member of the
organization briefly commented on the space shortage
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situation, "It's not an uncommon problem in ballet today."
Another employee observed how the lack of space had
hindered the growth of the organization, "The school
and company need a new building in the next few years so
everyone can have their space needs satisfied. The
school could grow physically the way it has the potential
to grow. Right now we are pretty much up to capacity
simply because we only have a very limited number of
studios to work in a very limited time period and the
company gets stuck in the same crunch in that they have
limited times for rehearsals."
The problem of managing and at times manipulating
the use of space turned scheduling classes and rehearsals
into a time-consuming and tedious endeavor for the ballet
master who was responsible for conjuring up space that
oftentimes was just not there. A glance at a typical
day's schedule revealed how a potentially tense work
environment could easily escalate into a potentially
explosive work situation, for connected to the problem
of scheduling classes and rehearsals was the problem of
company priorities versus school priorities. These
issues tended to frame the overall problem of the
shortage of space into a "them" and "us" situation that
spilled over into other areas of organizational conflict.
Members of the organization unanimously noted that as a
major source of conflict, for example, "We have a major
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conflict in terms of building usage and time because the
company needs all the time it can to rehearse, the school
needs time and space for classes, and it's a scheduling
nightmare and I think we all know that. It's being
addressed and they're (the board and others in top
management) looking at a capital campaign to build a
new or renovate this building at some point within the
next five years. We try to work with each other." So,
determining priorities in terms of studio space was a
major source of conflict between the school and the
company. As one organization member observed, "There's
an unresolved conflict because it was never stated what
takes priority. It all comes back to the same thing--
school and company."
Again, there were "scheduling nightmares" because
there were only four studios available for classes and
rehearsals even though on occasion the second and fourth
floors in the adjacent building were available. However,
they were available only for the students enrolled in the
Children's Summer Workshop. The fourth floor studio in
the adjacent building had a patchy linoleum floor that
had wide seams and gaps and two big floor-to-ceiling poles
in the center of the floor. Of the four studios on the
Clarendon Street side, again, three were on the first
floor and one on the second. There were six levels of
classes in the school, Basic through Six, separate classes
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for professional school students, and for persons over
twenty-one enrolled in the adult evening classes. A
mild day of activities involved scheduling at least four
levels of classes during the day in different courses,
i.e., in Men's Partnering, Pointe, Variations, or
Repertoire and Workshop. In addition, company classes
had to be scheduled. They began at 10:00 A.M. Open
classes, Level One through Five, were usually half-an-hour
and company classes were scheduled for an hour and one
half. Time had to be set aside for rehearsals for
different acts with each act in a separate studio. In.
addition, many performances, especially the full-scale
story ballets, called for three different casts. When
rehearsals for upcoming performances were scheduled
there was an ongoing jockeying for and shifting of studio
space. Open classes were then combined so that the
company dancers could rehearse. Often instructors who
taught also performed and were thus unable to conduct
their regularly scheduled classes. Space also had to be
provided for the couples who rehearsed duets. Once
scheduling was completed (or tentatively completed) the
information was then transmitted to the school and company
administrative offices and in turn passed on to the
instructors, students, and professional dancers. The
professional dancers, since they were union members of the
American Guild of Musical Artists, worked six hours a day
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in a span of ten hours. So, if they worked three hours
without a break they were allotted an hour off and if
they worked two and a half hours they were allotted
half-an-hour off. Thus, the activity of scheduling
people, time, and space was viewed as a "conflict
scheduling nightmare."
In addition to a lack of studio and office space for
classes, rehearsals, and administrative activities, there
was not enough space for storage, in the costume workroom,
or for parking.
The lack of studio space made it necessary to locate
company administrative offices in one building, school
administrative offices in another building, and the
offices of artistic personnel scattered somewhere in
between--near the studios in the school. These scattered
about office sites were fortunately in adjacent buildings
separated only by an alley. This arrangement often meant
that people were trotting back and forth between buildings
in all kinds of weather. Of course during balmy weather,
the trot could have a soothing effect. On the other hand,
it could have a disturbing effect during inclement weather.
This situation also intensified the existent "them"/"us"
dichotomy. Recently, however, a person in management who
had previously occupied*an office in company administrative
offices moved into one of the school's administrative
offices during the summer of 1984 to help alleviate
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the division that had grown and developed over the years
between artistic and management people and between company
and school people.
Similarly, the physical separateness also created
problems of organizational unawareness on the part of
those directly involved in administrative and artistic
matters. The unawareness level appeared higher for those
in the company administrative offices mainly because the
school administrative offices were located in the same
building as were the studios. An employee recalled,
"We consciously make an effort not to be 'us' and 'them'
but it's hard when your physically separate and every time
you get a new staff member in administration who until
they come over here and spend some time do not know and
understand what we do. If a person new in development is
trying to raise funds and knows nothing about ballet and
doesn't come over here and watch then that person doesn't
know why or what they're trying to raise funds for!"
The space shortage prevented a breakdown of students
in the studios, that is, fewer students in the classrooms.
An organization member recalled, "Right now, what we need
is more studios than students. In that way we can have
the breakdown of the levels of the classes with not so
many people in the classes." At times there were between
thirty and thirty-five students in a classroom. An
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instructor commented that, "There should be no more than
fifteen." During the Summer Dance Program, an eight-week
comprehensive course of study for professional and
preprofessional students, that had been in existence for five
years, 250 students were enrolled each year. An
organization member vividly recalled, "During that eight-
week course the school dominates the entire studio
facility, and when I say the school, I mean the population
of the school. The student body dominates all the studio
space." In terms of Summer Dance Program attendance,
there were, at times, forty to forty-five students in one
studio with one instructor. One organization member
noted, "I have no air conditioning and 250 kids. That's
for a very tense time."
Consequently, some organization members in the
confines of their offices and studios recalled the
fortunes of the San Francisco Ballet. They had
recently moved into a new $13.8 million facility, a
four-story building that had a dance school, offices,
and a rehearsal hall the size of its regular performance
stage that was located directly across the street in a
place called the War Memorial Opera House. Moreover,
the facility was paid for by the time it opened. Another
member of the organization mused, "if we had a building
like the San Francisco Ballet . . . It is the heaven of
dance companies across the country . . . and we were
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shown the whole new building and of course turned pea
green with envy and cried later in the hotel."
In sum, this section has attempted a consideration
of the lack of studio space at the Boston Ballet. It
should be noted that, in addition to a lack of studio
space, there was also a lack of rehearsal, office,
storage, and parking space at the Ballet.
Throughout the history of the Boston Ballet, poor
physical conditions had plagued the organization while
at the same time contributing to situations where
problems of conflict frequently became enmeshed with
other organizational problems. Questions of whether or
not company or school people would use available studio
space often placed organizational members and groups in
conflict with one another not only over questions of who
or which group would use available studio space but also
over the importance to the organization of work
activities. In other words, it came down to problems of
whose work took precedence over the work of others. This
situation was often characterized by organization members
appearing to carry out their work activities at the
expense of others. This problem also reinforced other
organizational differences that existed between and among
individuals in the company and those in the school and
between those in management and those in artistic
positions. Thus, the lack of studio space led to conflict
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that had become entrenched within the system and remained
there.
Recently, however, the space problem was being
addressed. Taking into consideration the organization's
limited resources, its history of financial instability,
and its limited sources of private and public support,
many in the organization gave every indication that
they were ready for a major change, for it appeared that
the board viewed the Ballet as having grown enough in
the past forty-plus years and was therefore considering
a new facility. In fact, a strategic plan for fiscal
year 1986 was to "develop a fund-raising campaign for
a new facility for the Boston Ballet."
Overview Conflict-in-Development
As an organization changes through development (and
growth, often there are struggles between individuals and
among groups in the organization over facts, means, ends,
and values. In the case of the Boston Ballet, there were
struggles over the lack of studio space, the style of
dance, the role of the board, the artistic director, and
the president, and over the goals and objectives of the
organization. These struggles, I have defined as
conflict-in-development. Features of conflict-in-
development, outlined below, present the central issues
of conflict-in-development discovered at the Boston Ballet.
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In the next chapter, I will attempt to explore and examine
features of conflict-in-development within a Model 0-I:
Limited Learning Systems framework.
The features of conflict-in-development include:
1. The persistence of conflict around issues of
organizational roles, values, and methods.
2. The stages of conflict where issues and
interactions of conflict occur only at
certain times.
3. The contradictions of conflict where an
organization grows and develops despite
conflict.
4. The learning from experience in some cases
but not in others.
The conflict between the artistic force at the ballet
and the management force began in earnest in 1971 when the
board brought in a new management team and limited the
authority of the founder. The conflict that began then
continues to this day. The board of trustees was
established to raise money and to develop policy. The
board has raised relatively little money over the years
and has been involved directly in the management and
artistic decisions of the company since the early 1970s.
The conflict of the style of the ballet has persisted
ever since Williams had to cut down on her teaching.
Williams had the initial and major contacts with
Balanchine, Lowry and the Ford Foundation, and was thus
instrumental in bringing in grant funding, but the
organization never really followed a plan of sound fiscal
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management and periodically drifted to the verge of
bankruptcy. With the Boston Ballet Company and the
Boston Ballet School in the same small facility, there
was never adequate space and the problems that this
lack of space generated never seemed a priority of
management and of the board of trustees. Throughout
these conflicts, Williams was always the informal
mediating force that held the organization together.
Certain events seemed to happen in the organization
only after some sort of change in the founder's role.
When Williams died and could no longer informally mediate,
the conflict between the artistic director and the
president worsened and consequently the president and
the artistic director resigned within twelve days of
each other. When the board began to limit the founder's
authority in the organization, they started a pattern of
interference with management and artistic decisions.
When Williams could not personally spend the time teaching
the style of the school began to drift in a number of
different directions.
Despite the limited funds of the organization, the
conflicts between management and artistic units, the
conflict regarding style, the board interventions into
management and artistic decisions, the Boston Ballet had
not only survived, but developed and had earned an
international reputation. Since the early 1970s, there
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had been a steady effort to limit the authority and
influence of the founder of the school and company.
However, it was Williams' energy, determination, and
charisma that kept the ballet alive and growing
regardless of her formal role in the organization. She
was indeed the "catalyst."
There are a number of instances where the
organization seemed to have learned from its experiences:
the board removed the position of president from the
organizational structure that it redesigned late in
1984 thus eliminating the structural conflict between the
position of the president and the position of the artistic
director; the board established the Boston Ballet
Company and the Boston Ballet School as two separate
nonprofit organizations with separate boards and separate
executive and program officers thereby eliminating the
possibility of the commingling of funds and diffused
responsibilities; and the Boston Ballet returned to its
community-based mission when it became apparent in 1984
that the strategy of national and international touring
with a famous guest artist was very risky financially
and eroded the organization's natural home constituency.
There are also a number of instances where the
organization has not learned from experience: the
board's effort to improve the ballet lacked an awareness
of the critical role(s) that E. Virginia Williams played
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in the organization; the organization did not realize the
importance of maintaining the unique and cohesive style
of dance which had established the reputation of the
Boston Ballet; and the new artistic director, who was
selected in January 1985, had all the functions that
Williams had in 1970: artistic director, chief
administrator, and fund-raiser. If these functions were
too much for one person in 1970, how can one person
handle them in the more complex and growing environment
of the future?
CHAPTER 6
EXPLANATIONS: CONFLICT-IN-DEVELOPMENT
A First Look
In thinking about events reflected on by organization
members at the Boston Ballet, four central issues of
organizational conflict were identified and referred to as
conflict-in-development. In this final chapter, I will
attempt to address these issues against some of the core
features of Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems that are
outlined in Chapter two. In this endeavor, the model will
serve as a guide in explaining conflict in development,
along with mapping and diagnosing the Boston Ballet, i.e.,
"describing how the organization got to its present state".
The recurring conflicts and problems of the Boston
Ballet, the conflict over the appropriate role of the
board, the conflict between the artistic director and the
president, the reoccurring financial problems, the conflict
between the artistic and management groups, and the lack of
adequate space can be explained in terms of the primary
inhibitory loops that grew out of the Model I Theories-in-
Use of the members of the organization and the inappropriate
behavior that the loops produced. Members of the board did
not want to deal with the threatening issue of their
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appropriate role of fund-raising and financial
responsibility. Members of the board unilaterally coerced
E. Virginia Williams into relinquishing various roles within
the organization. They assumed that a relatively young
and famous former prima ballerina/artistic director was
essential to the financial success of the organization and
they assumed that a national and international touring
program with the company performing full-length story
ballets would benefit the organization in financially
successful ways. They assumed the image of someone who
looked physically like a "bag lady" was inappropriate for
an internationally acclaimed ballet company. If these
assumptions had been publicly tested, some serious errors
may have been avoided. The Boston Ballet developed
dysfunctional organizational norms and activities. The
board members felt that it was appropriate to deal with
operational activities and to ask members of the company to
to perform for them free at social gatherings. Staff members
used the board to try and force one another out of various
positions and the board complied. The board created
organizational structures which created natural conflicts
between two positions, that is, the president and the
artistic director. Dysfunctional intergroup relations
developed between the artistic and management sections of
the organization. They contended with one another from
different sides of the "alley". There were dysfunctional
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group dynamics within the company. The "open war" between
Verdy, Garrick, various members of the management team, and
the board was the classic win/loose dynamic. The
organization had to have a serious problem of group-think
to be unaware of the importance of Williams' teaching style
and founding contacts to the continued success of the
organization. On the other hand, Williams' attempt to do
everything herself rather than building a team to succeed
her was destined to turn success into, not failure, but
conditions for conflict. The organization seemed
unaware of the errors that were consistently produced by its
financial management style, its lack of space, its drift
away from a unique and cohesive dance style, and its drift
away from the original mission of serving the Boston and
New England areas.
The fact that certain things only happened with some
change in the formal or informal role of the founder,
E. Virginia Williams, can be explained in terms of apparently
incongruent information, the theories-in-use of members of
the organization, and dysfunctional group dynamics.
Williams' lack of glamour and fame seemed incongruent with
the importance of her teaching style, financial contacts,
and her charismatic leadership of the Boston Ballet. The
board members avoided publicly testing a variety of
assumptions concerning williams and every time she was asked
to "step aside," problems resulted. When she died and her
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informal mediating role was lost, the organization blew up.
By the same token, Williams did not try to institutionalize
her fund-raising contacts, her teaching, and leadership into
the structure of the organization. Based on her actions, she
probably had a number of assumptions about the Ballet and
its members that she did not test publicly. The group
dynamics surrounding Williams' transition from founder
and driving force of the organization to artistic advisor
and informal mediator were filled with win/lose situations,
little building on what had been developed before, and an
unwillingness to raise questions that did not go along with
the majority view of the "inner circle" of the board.
The contradictions of the organization and the learning
from experience in some cases and not in others both seem
to flow from whether they were based in correctable errors
or uncorrectable errors. Despite the primary and secondary
inhibitory loops, the organization with Williams' leadership
was able to correct some errors and produce actions that were
appropriate to some of the problems of the Boston Ballet.
The funding by major foundations continued and the
reputation of the company and the school grew. On the other
hand, the board's effort to unilaterally force Williams from
leadership positions was based on errors that were
uncorrectable because they were threatening to the
individuals and the system hiding the error. Uncorrectable
errors can only lead to camouflage, second-order loops, and
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more double-binds for the individuals in the organization.
Eliminating the structural conflict between the
president and the artistic director, separating the company
from the school, and returning to the original community-
based mission of the company were all examples of appropriate
responses that came from a learning cycle which dealt with
correctable errors. Forcing Williams from positions of
leadership unilaterally, losing the distinctive and cohesive
dance style of the Boston Ballet, appointing a new artistic
director in 1985 with all the functions that were too much
for one person in 1970 were all examples of uncorrectable
errors whose discovery might threaten the individuals, the
system, and the Model I Theories-in-Use.
A Second Look
Why did conflict-in-development evolve around a
"meddling"board, a management/artistic dichotomy, financial
instability, an undefined teaching and company dance style,
and the lack of studio and rehearsal space?
In terms of the "meddling" board, the members seemed
unaware of their responsibility in correcting their own
errors so that the board could, in turn, correct
organizational errors. But the board was hindered in
seeing its own errors or understanding its own theory-in-use
or the individual theories-in-use of the board members.
Based on Model 0-I, the board, trapped in Column 3 (see
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Figure 1): Model I theories-in-use, avoided the threatening
issue of looking at its own behavior (or its theory of
action) that might help explain its behavior. If the board
were to discover, for example, its error in "meddling" in
artistic and management matters, this discovery would
require correcting organizational errors that were
threatening to them and to other organization members.
Discovery of the errors would result in a need to review
those provisions of the bylaws that granted unlimited
powers to the board. Questioning the powers spelled out
in the bylaws, provisions that were drawn up more than
twenty years ago when the board was assembled and
controlled by a strong founder and made up of friends of
the founder, balletomanes, mothers of dancers, and friends
of friends could jeopardize the positions of many in the
organization. Presently, the governing board controls a
number of artistic and management activities. Thus,
reviewing and, if necessary, revising the bylaw provisions,
those rules affecting board members' duties and
responsibilities, would require that organizational
inquiry take place. To my knowledge, organizational
double-loop learning had never occurred, that is, inquiry
where board members had given away some their powers through
the process of changing bylaw provisions. If the board were
to look at some of the norms that govern its functioning,
this action might eventually lead to the discovery of
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uncorrectable errors where questioning the validity of the
1963 bylaws, in terms of the model, would lead to Column 8:
Camouflage--a reaction to uncorrectable errors whose
discovery would threaten the organization. This route
lessens the likelihood that board members will double-loop
learn. Thus, the board would deny that the bylaws needed
revising or that the rules they advocated were no longer
relevant in 1985 because of organizational growth and change
in the past thirty years. If this form of self-protection
failed, however, board members could then seal themselves off
from blame by declaring that they were functioning well
within the guidelines in making incursions into artistic
and administrative duties. This self-protection would
lessen the possibility of their being vulnerable through
the loss of status and power that might accompany revision
of the bylaws.
Column 1 of Model 0-I provides a look at how the
board's behavioral strategies ranged, at times, from
ambiguous/unambiguous, vague/clear, inconsistent/consistent,
and incongruent/congruent. These behavioral strategies
interacted with Model I theories-in-use reinforced and
created new conditions for error. For example, the
board's reason for hiring Verdy and the board's actions
from 1980-1984 appeared ambiguous, vague, changeable,
incompatible, and incongruent. They were ambiguous and
vague because it was never explicitly made clear to Verdy,
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Garrick, other organization members, and the public why
the board had hired Verdy other than to improve the
company's image and give it a new focus. How? In what
ways would Verdy contribute to a new focus and improve the
organization's image? As it turned out, in terms of
image, Verdy may have proved to be more of a liability than
an asset in a number of ways. If the board's purpose in
hiring a former prima ballerina as artistic director was
clearly stated and its strategies for improving the Ballet's
image were, in turn, explicitly made clear to Verdy,
especially in relation to her interactions with Garrick,
Williams, the board, and other organization members, then
the conditions for conflict created as a result of unclear
role assignments, may have been prevented early on. In
hiring Verdy, allowing her free rein in artistic matters,
and then apparently reversing a commitment to changing the
focus and image of the organization by reining her in when
her spending got out of hand was clearly inconsistent
behavior on the part of the board. The board's behavior must
have seemed especially vague and inconsistent to Verdy who
without clear-cut guidelines did not know the rules that had
to be followed and adhered to while changing the focus of the
Ballet or in improving its image. National and international
touring, hiring and travelling with famous guest artists, and
staging full-length story ballets seemed inappropriate
strategies given the original mission and the financial
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constraints of the Boston Ballet.
Also, the board's behavior appeared inconsistent if
its goal was to improve the organization's image in the
Boston Area or to build its Boston audience. What were the
advantages in hiring an international star, a former prima
ballerina? What did it mean to the Ballet's Boston
audience and prospective audience? Cultivating and
impressing the present and prospective Ballet audience may
have also occurred at less financial loss if the board had
hired a former pupil of Williams who had gained a national or
international reputation if the board's primary objective
was indeed improving the organization's image and focus.
In appointing Verdy, the board's motives and behavioral
strategies could be perceived as vague, inconsistent, and
incongruent; incongruent because touring and producing
big ballets at home and abroad continued for some time
despite financial losses. Their is the probability that
the Boston audience may have grown, the Ballet's image
enhanced, its focus appropriately directed, and public
and private support increased if the organization had
conveyed a message that it wanted to improve its image
not only artistically, but also financially. In thinking
of the Boston performing arts audiences and supporters,
performing arts organizations may indeed improve their
artistic image if at first they improve their financial
images. In Wolf's terms, the organization should
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"dress up" for fund-raising purposes by first putting
its fiscal affairs in order.
Again, looking at Model 0-I, we can see the appearance
of behaviors that lead to a pattern or system where more
error; decreased probability for double-loop learning, i.e.,
detecting and correcting error in ways that involve
examining and modifying the Ballet's underlying norms,
policies, and objectives; and more double binds for
individuals occur. Error correction strategies that call
for individuals in top management positions to examine
the organization's theory-in-use also involve the
examination of their individual theories-in-use at some
point in the learning process. Again, the behavior
expected of Verdy and Garrick was never spelled out by the
board, communicated to them, or to others in the organization
that they worked with in producing ballets. Organizational
chains of authority and lines of responsibility and
reporting appeared vague. That there were apparent
prescribed or proscribed ways of behaving in those roles
contributed to the artistic/management conflict that, until
1984, was mediated by Williams. Put another way, there were
few, if any, criteria or established procedures to guide
the behavior of the artistic director who worked alternately
within and outside of the shadow of Williams--an awkward
situation (equally awkward if Williams walked in Verdy's
shadow), and the behavior of a second president whose
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predecessor functioned primarily as a figurehead rather than
as a chief executive. In fact a board member had acted as
president before Garrick arrived. It is unclear if Garrick,
without a job description or guidelines to direct his
behavior as president, proceeded to go about doing his work
in a way that seemed opposed to his new organizational
environment and organizational expectations. Had the
governing body of the board explicitly stated his duties
and responsibilities? If not, what governing variables
were guiding his behavior?
In terms of the Verdy-Garrick conflict, we see that
primary inhibitory loops can lead to "self-reinforcing
cycles" where conditions for organizational error persist
and reoccur. In other words, the behaviors of Verdy and
Garrick, whether a product of unspecified organizational
norms or previous organizational norms or role behaviors
that accompanied them to the Boston Ballet led to first
suppressed, then mediated, and eventually open conflict.
Boston Ballet "behavioral maps" to guide their behavior
appeared obscure. Organization norms, i.e., the
company/school and the artistic/management dichotomies
reinforced the win/lose dynamics of the Verdy-Garrick
conflict. Williams, guided by her private map, responded
to conflict unilaterally by buffering the conflict of
threatening issues. This behavior drew the contestants
deeper into games of deception, of blaming others, and of
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avoiding blame. At top management levels, where governing
board members, Garrick, and Verdy interacted, dysfunctional
group (artistic/management) dynamics and dysfunctional
intergroup (governing board members, the artistic director,
and the president) dynamics were generated. Finally, added
to these dysfunctional organizational norms and activities
were the unknown motives of the parties to the conflict
which eventually reached a stage very close to destructive
warfare. I would assume, however, at that stage, that the
governing body of the board discovered that the organization
was approaching a brittle and perhaps unchangeable stage and
that the conflict would become entrenched and therefore even
more difficult to correct or respond to appropriately.
Hence, so the Ballet could continue to fulfill its mission,
the board had- to ask for the resignation of Garrick and
accept Verdy's resignation. Eventually, the position of
president was eliminated. This decision appeared to be a
result of single-loop learning in that board members
indicated that they were aware of error and corrected it
by changing the organizational structure but did not really
examine the values or norms underlying their theory-in-use.
The elimination of the position of president "camouflaged",
i.e., denied and disguised, the board's role in the conflict.
It is unlikely that a "good dialectic" actually occurred at
the Ballet, i.e. where both single- and double-loop
organizational inquiry and learning occurred.
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In terms of an organizational environment where one
cohesive dance style could develop and grow and where
adequate studio rehearsal space for both company and dance
was available, let us again look at some of the features of
Model 0-I to help explain why solutions to these two problems
of organizational conflict were not sought earlier. There
were individuals in the organization who believed that
building an adequate facility and arriving at a cohesive
dance style were problems that warranted immediate attention
and action. Camouflage helps explain why these problems were
riot dealt with until fairly recently. Solutions to these
problems were directly related to the duties and
responsibilities of the board, the artistic director,
executive director. Confronting organization members
about their duties and responsibilities could easily turn
into threatening situations, especially, if questions of
job performance were raised. Searching for solutions to
these problems would entail questioning organizational
norms and values. For example, what were the views of
various organization members on space and comfortable
work environment? Were there organizational norms and
values held by board members on space and the physical
organizational environment that prevented their addressing
the problem early on? Was it the problem of financial
insecurity that is a common feature of most performing
arts organizations? In order to correct organizational
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error, it is necessary to identify the source of errors.
Addressing the problem of both space and style head-on
would involve modification of organizational objectives and
activities which, in turn, would involve inquiry into
individual and organizational theories-in-use. If these
inquiries were made they would most likely lead to
individuals questioning their norms (why instructors
did not work cooperatively towards developing and
maintaining a distinct and cohesive dance style) and the
norms governing the board's behavior (why did the board
fail to raise the funds to provide an adequate facility).
But rather than making inquiry into these problems, the
members of the organization ignored, denied, and suppressed
them for years.
Finally, a second look at conflict-in-development
while exploring and explaining organizational learning and
failure to learn through a theory of action perspective
based on Model 0-I: Limited Learning Systems facilitated
identifying those circumstances where cause and effect
relationships might have determined the nature of
conditions for conflict and the processes of conflict.
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